The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME VI | New York, Saturday, February 19, 1916 | Number 68

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FOR the first time since August, 1914, a Republican of unimpeachable conservatism and orthodoxy and of exceptional personal authority has dared to advocate a radical and aggressive policy for the United States in respect to the issues raised by the war. The speech of ex-Senator Root delivered in New York City on February 15th may well be the forerunner of a new epoch in American foreign policy. It supplies to the aggressive element in public opinion an encouragement and a leadership for which it has been waiting, and which it has received from Mr. Roosevelt rather than from a good Republican. Mr. Root condemned the Wilson administration chiefly because of the timid irresponsibility of its conduct of the foreign affairs of the country. During one of the great crises in the history of the world, at a moment when opportunity existed to make the United States a positive influence on behalf of international order, Mr. Wilson, with the cordial acquiescence of his own party, elected to remain scrupulously neutral in word and deed, and solemnly advised neutrality in thought and feeling. Mr. Root has expressed with the utmost force the malaise which gradually crept over sensitive and aspiring Americans, not because they had been kept out of the war, but because the official policy of their country at a time of intense emotional ferment had furnished them with no source or outlet of moral and social convictions. He embodies the higher standard of international responsibility which during the past eighteen months could have been imposed on American public opinion by a real leader.

MR. ROOT goes as far as the most thoroughgoing radical could wish in proclaiming the end of American isolation. He says: "We have begun to realize that America, with its vast foreign trade, with its citizens scattered over the whole earth, with millions of aliens upon its soil, with its constantly increasing participation in world-wide efforts for the benefit of mankind, with a thousand bonds of intercourse and intimacy uniting it to other nations, is no longer isolated; that our nation can no longer live unto itself alone or stand aloof from the rest of mankind; that we must play some part in the progress of civilization, recognize some duties as correlative to our rights." Neither does Mr. Root doubt as to what the duties are. He states that a democracy such as the United States could not survive in a world in which "the rule of action applied to Belgium is to be tolerated." "It was not necessary," he says, "that the United States should go to war in defense of the violated law. A single official expression by the government of the United States, a single sentence denying assent and recording disapproval of what Germany did in Belgium would have given to the people of America the leadership to which they were entitled in their earnest groping for the light." When we remember that this utterance is made by a patient, shrewd, experienced man of the

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world, the recognized intellectual leader of the Republican party, as the first blast of criticism against the Democrats delivered at a state convention at the very beginning of a Presidential campaign, we may get some conception of its enormous weight and possible importance. It may commit the Republican party to the advocacy of an explicit guarantee of Belgian neutrality after the war is over. It may fasten on the Republicans a foreign policy which will eventually align the United States with the liberal European Powers in the enforcement of a new code of public law. Such is the result which Mr. Root probably has in mind, and the country is fortunate to find a statesman who has the vision to discern the goal and the method, and the courage to attempt the conversion of his own party to so radical a departure from American traditions in foreign affairs.

HOW will Mr. Root's and Mr. Roosevelt's initiative in this matter be accepted by the Republicans of the Middle and the Far West? That is the all-important question of the political campaign during the next few months. Mr. Root has indicated to the Republican party the most effective way in which a sharp issue can be made with the Democrats. If such an issue is not made, the Democrats will enter the final campaign with every advantage of position. They are consequently busily engaged in trying to take the issues of preparedness and foreign policy out of "politics," but the Republicans would be foolish to acquiesce. The latter might win even if no such issues ever flourished, but their victory would bring with it no spring of party loyalty and enthusiasm. Mr. Root has offered to the Republicans the opportunity of becoming once again the party of aggressive and enlightened nationalism, at least in foreign affairs. Democracy under Mr. Wilson stands for nothing at all except a foreign policy of neutral isolation and a domestic policy of subordinating administration to politics. The President's solicitude has been exercised on behalf of party harmony rather than party integrity. Hitherto it has looked as if the Republicans would follow the bad example of their opponents. They were doing nothing to seize the issues presented to them by Mr. Wilson—of a positive responsible rather than a negative and irresponsible foreign policy. They will create discord within the party by accepting the challenge, but by no other method can Republicanism be brought back as a vital political principle and power. In order to distinguish progressive Republicanism from a relaxed Democracy, they must throw over some Republicans who have forgotten the better party tradition of eager and responsible nationalism.

ONE important consequence of the recent reform of the banking law has been to improve the machinery for appealing to public opinion in the interest of legitimate development of banking institutions. As a people we have always been unduly suspicious of the banks. We could not gauge with certainty the real power of lending institutions, therefore we feared it. Any suggestion originating with the banks for broadening their activities we were disposed to reject as a scheme for exploiting the general public; and competent suggestions were not likely to originate elsewhere. Our banking development has accordingly been retarded by all manner of unnecessary restrictions. With the creation of a Federal Reserve Board representing the people as well as the banks and quite able to subject the banks to such regulation as public interest may require, this suspicious attitude is disappearing. Among the amendments of the law recommended by the board are two that would formerly have raised a popular outcry. One would permit national banks to establish branch offices within the city or county in which they are located, and the other would permit national banks to subscribe to stock in banks organized to carry on banking business in foreign countries. These are excellent amendments, and if any energy is generated to push them, nothing can stand in the way of their enactment.

AMERICAN banks organized to do business in foreign countries are a visible sign of the close of our period of national isolation. Primarily such banks are intended to further our export trade. In many countries the supply of local capital is so scanty that only an inconsiderable business can be had on a cash basis. There are buyers with sound credit, but only institutions specializing in credit can find them for us. In international as in domestic trade it is just as important for the buyer to find sellers who will trust him with goods as for the seller to find buyers with sound credit. The interests of both are served by the foreign bank, which undertakes to organize credit. Such a bank helps to build up the wealth of both the exporting and the importing country, and lays the basis for a more copious volume of future trade. It can become an active factor in internationalization. To be sure, foreign branches of powerful banks have sometimes been used as instruments of imperialistic exploitation —witness the Deutsche Bank and the Russo-Chinese Bank. But these are quasi-governmental institutions, and their imperialistic policy has been directed by government. Our proposed foreign banks will have no imperialistic influence behind them. They will subserve purely business interests, and business interests are most profitable when politically neutral.

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BOTH houses of Congress have included in the deficiency bill an appropriation of $600,000 to carry on the work upon a central light, heat and power plant for government buildings in Washington. This item was included in spite of protests from the Commission of Fine Arts, a body created by federal statute, the American Institute of Architects, the American Federation of Arts, and the Committee of One Hundred on the Future Development of Washington. These protests have all been made at the eleventh hour. Whose fault is that? Is there not in existence an executive order, issued by President Wilson on November 28th, 1913, and providing that "whenever new structures are to be erected in the District of Columbia under the direction of the federal government which affect in any important way the appearance of the city . . . final action shall not be taken" until the plans of these new structures "have been submitted to the Commission of Fine Arts?" Why didn't the Commission protest when the plans were submitted? The answer is that the Commission protested at the earliest possible moment, and that the Treasury Department disobeyed the executive order by letting the contracts before submitting the designs. Only by accident did the Commission discover what was going on, and not until this discovery was made, about January 20th, did the Treasury Department consult the Commission. The Department's own explanation of its failure to lay the plans before the Commission may be condensed into one word—oversight.

IF we take the Treasury Department's explanation of failure to consult on the proposed new government building at its face value, we cannot help wondering at the amount of damage that may be done by a single oversight, provided the oversight is consistently carried out. For the damage to Washington's appearance will be great. The Commission of Fine Arts does not object to a central light, heat and power plant for the government buildings. It does oppose the erection of chimneys nearly two hundred feet high just south of the Mall, and plainly visible from many parts of the city. It opposes the placing of any power plant on this part of the Potomac, where it will ruin the design to give Washington a river front as beautiful as that of Paris. All the Commission asked was that work be suspended until a more thorough study of the problem had been made. In comparison with the Commission's opinion upon the questions involved, the opinion of anyone in the Treasury Department is of no importance. The Commission exists to prevent officials who have no imaginative grasp of the plans for the æsthetic improvement of Washington from making exactly the kind of mistake the Treasury officials have made in this case. Congress can correct this mistake by taking action to stop work on this disfiguring building. This action will cost the money already spent, and an additional sum that the contractor will be entitled to. The price will be low if it teaches officials not to let their own taste loose upon Washington without consulting the Commission of Fine Arts.

THE classic tradition of presenting Alma Mater with a Spanish garden or a Greek theater was violated recently when sixty women, graduates of the first four classes of Bryn Mawr College, announced as their twenty-fifth anniversary gift a study of fire prevention for the whole state of Pennsylvania. Under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, two experts have been chosen to push the work of investigating those state industrial establishments employing women and girls, to the end of minimizing the fire dangers surrounding them. Whether inspired by the Triangle fire disaster or the more recent horrors in Pittsburgh and Williamsburg, the women are obviously actuated by a deep-lying sense of correlation to their age. "Picturesque archaic proposals serve to throw in high relief the distinguishing achievements of the present time," says their announcement, "its discovery of the facts of poverty; its gathering and girding of a new public spirit to shoulder this knowledge, its promise of beauty, not only of surroundings but of race." The concluding suggestion is that since a "college generation" has successfully joined forces to promote a piece of public work, other college groups who "have shared a common life and training may well in after years afford finely adjusted agencies for public service." That their contribution will succeed in mitigating notorious factory dangers is probable, but more significant is the fact that the women themselves testify to a new sense of responsibility.

ON what principle is censorship being guided in the American theatre? On no clear principle, apparently, but in obedience to the pressure of certain powerful organizations. It was at the instance of Roman Catholic societies that the Russian ballet was pruned in New York and Boston. The suppression of "Marie Odile" in Boston was a submission to the same power, and that play has just been revised in Philadelphia to suit Catholic sensibilities at the instance of the Holy Name Society, the Ancient Order of Hibernians and the head of the Catholic Theatre Movement. The management was not compelled to make its changes by the director of public safety, but he advised them, and the management yielded. Is it desirable that such pressure should be tolerated by authors, theatrical

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producers, the public itself and the servants of the public? The answer may be inferred from the rumor that German societies in Philadelphia now want the total extinction of "Marie Odile." The offense to group susceptibilities ought not to be the measure of restriction in the theater. Unless the offense reacts unwholesomely on the whole public, there should be no restriction.

OPPONENTS of military preparedness say it is supported by those who would profit from increased manufacture of munitions. Opponents of government-owned armament plants say such plants are demanded by "pork-barrel" interests. The fact that these charges balance each other so nicely should demonstrate that they are irrelevant to the main issue. So long as private profit exists, the nation cannot arm in any way which will not be profitable to somebody—at the very least to the laborers employed. Shall the nation therefore go unarmed? The real way to neutralize these lobbies is not blindly to attempt the endless task of defeating their proposals in detail, but to subject them to the control of a strong national purpose. A preparedness which includes a well-knit national organization of administration, industries and labor will help create the only kind of government which can be secure against the peculations of small groups and local interests.

A Costly Resignation

SECRETARY GARRISON'S resignation has again altered the atmosphere and contour of the American political landscape. During the hulabaloo of Mr. Wilson's political pilgrimage through the Middle West it looked as if the President intended to resume the part which he had played so successfully during his first year as Governor of New Jersey; it looked as if he would rise to his extraordinary opportunity of leadership and rally to his support the alert and aggressive part of American public opinion. That hope and expectation must now be abandoned. The President seems unable to hold a sustained course. He alternates helplessly between energy and inertia, between fighting and yielding, between leading his country and allowing his party to lead him, between dosing his fellow countrymen with a tonic and conniving at their malady of complacent indifference and apprehensive irresponsibility. His abandonment of Mr. Garrison throws him back into the unenviable position which he has occupied during the past year. He has established himself as a political chief, responsible more than any one man should be for the policy and behavior of a great country, who at a time when vigorous, sustained and well-considered action was supremely necessary, proved incapable of initiating anything better than hasty half-measures with not more than part of a conviction behind them.

The disagreement which resulted in Mr. Garrison's resignation throws into relief the enormous difficulties and perplexities of the President's situation and his own inveterate habit of dealing with them. He dodges until they close in upon him, whereupon he surrenders or fights long enough to secure time for another dodge. During the summer, as the result of his knowledge of the unscrupulous attempts of the belligerents to use the United States as an instrument of their military interests, the President decided that American neutrality if it was to be respected must be armed. He has represented this increased armament as wholly compatible with the traditions of his own party and that of the nation, but his own party has not accepted the representation. Effective military preparedness demanded a thoroughgoing centralized control of the resources of the country in industry and men, which was most obnoxious to many of his fellow countrymen of all parties, but particularly to many of his fellow Democrats. A Democratic President who proposed to prepare for possible war should have started a campaign of education six months ago, and should have calculated most carefully just how far he could go in proposing a centralized military organization. Mr. Wilson adopted neither of these precautions. He consented to a plan, contrived under the direction of his Secretary of War, which made American men citizens of the nation for military purposes rather than citizens of the state. Yet he did nothing to arouse the country to the need of military equipment as the necessary weapon of a democracy which was no longer made secure by geographical isolation. Such laxity was bound to compromise either his plan or his prestige. A President who knew his own party and Congress would understand that the project of a national militia could not be forced on Congress unless considerable support could be secured from public opinion. It meant a fight, and a President who challenges Congress to a fight should pick his ground carefully and should be willing and ready to see the fight through.

The President did not pick his ground with sufficient care; he did not seek sufficiently the support of public opinion; he was not willing to see it through. At first he seemed inclined to do nothing in support of his own plans. Then suddenly he put on the gloves, squared away and declaimed as if he was

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every inch a fighter. But when the handkerchief fell he was not proud enough to fight. He quit. This may seem a hard sentence, but it is not too hard. We realize all that a contest with Congress might have cost him at the present time; we realize that if he had accepted battle he might have split his party, impaired his own chance of reëlection, and prevented the adoption at the present session of Congress of any plan for an improved military establishment. But if he was not reconciled to fighting hard, he should not have allowed his administration to be committed to a program which could be carried only after a hard fight. Moreover, sooner or later the fight which Mr. Wilson started will have to be made. In this respect Secretary Garrison was right. The matter at issue between the Secretary and Congress did not concern details. It concerned a principle of military organization, the embodiment of which in the new military establishment was vital and of which the President was the only possible effective champion. The principle on which Mr. Garrison insisted was that of national rather than local control of an instrument of essentially national policy, such as the army. Congress was certain to seek the incorporation of the new citizen soldiers into its own special system of local graft. That system is the fatal obstacle to plans of national administrative reorganization whether for peace or war; and now that such reorganization is becoming a matter of national safety, a President could not have made a better beginning of the work of preparedness than by accepting the challenge to a battle with its inevitable enemy.

As it is, Congress has obtained a striking success in that struggle for control over government which it has for so many generations been carrying on with the executive. A President has allowed a Cabinet minister to resign because Congress rejected legislation embodying a principle essential, in the minister's opinion, to the conduct of the business of his department. Of all the blows dealt to sound administration during Mr. Wilson's term of office this is the worst. No wonder an air of satisfaction pervades the Capitol at Washington. The great structure of "Congressional government" which Mr. Wilson explained so lucidly and criticized so ruthlessly in his first book thirty years ago, and which had been somewhat damaged by the growth of executive leadership and the expansion of partially independent administrative functions, has been reenforced and extended. The control which the President proposes to exercise over Congress by assuming a kind of prime ministerial leadership of that body has been converted into its opposite. The President rather than Congress is being subject to control. Whenever it comes to an important conflict the President yields. Congressmen are beginning to realize what a rare opportunity of aggrandizement is opened to them by the leadership of a man who is content to walk at the head of a procession along a route determined by his followers. As long as he remains in the White House the work of Congressional aggrandizement can be securely carried on, and the prestige of the Presidential office insidiously undermined.

No doubt Mr. Wilson will not continue to be as weak as he showed himself in the correspondence with Mr. Garrison. There will be moments in which he will look and talk like a real leader, who understands that the power of the Presidential office depends on the direct personal contact of its incumbent with popular opinion. He has learned a good deal during the past three years, and if, owing to the greater weakness of the opposition, he is reelected, he may surprise Congress by pursuing during his second term somewhat different tactics. But it will take a long period of good behavior to restore public confidence in him. He is not up to his job. During a period of polite readjustment in which a few superficial changes in the economic system needed to be garnished with fine words for popular delectation, Mr. Wilson might have made an adequate President, but he is not the man to cast for a star part in a revolutionary play. These are rough, grim, dangerous times, in which a statesman needs a mixture of deep understanding and established purpose similar to that which enabled Mr. Lincoln to pilot his country through the Civil War. Mr. Wilson's understanding is flexible and graceful but it is not robust; his will is patient and tenacious, but its tenacity counts for little because it is not sustained by a definitive intelligence. He is always with the utmost fluency expressing his mind, but he never really knows it.

Guns On the Merchant Ship

ON August 25th, 1914, the British Ambassador informed the State Department at Washington that a number of armed British merchantmen would soon be visiting American ports, and that the armament was "solely a precautionary measure adopted for the purpose of defence against attack from hostile craft." Mr. Bryan replied four days later acknowledging the note, and adding that he understood it to imply an assurance that armed merchant ships "will never fire unless first fired upon, and that they will never under any circumstances attack any vessel." During the week following, the Adriatic, carrying four guns, and the Merrion, carrying six, arrived

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in our ports. Ambassador Spring-Rice informed Mr. Bryan on September 4th that these ships were to be disarmed " in order to avoid the difficult questions of the character and degree of armament which would justify detention." That is, it was an act of courtesy and not a concession of principle. On September 19th, 1914, the State Department issued a memorandum specifying what it meant by defensive armament. The main point was that the presumption is against the armed ship, but it may establish its defensive character by proof indicating:

1. The calibre of the guns does not exceed six inches.
2. The guns and small arms are few in number.
3. No guns are mounted forward.
4. The quantity of ammunition is small.
5. Officers and crew are of normal peace standard.
6. The vessel follows the usual trade route.
7. The vessel does not carry an unusual amount of fuel.
8. The cargo consists of articles of commerce unsuited for the use of a ship of war in operations against an enemy.
9. The passengers are on the whole non-combatants.
10. The speed of the ship is slow.

Finally the memorandum adds that " the conversion of a merchant vessel into a ship of war is a question of fact which is to be established by direct or circumstantial evidence of intention to use the vessel as a ship of war."

A month later, October 15th, 1914, the German government entered a protest stating that " this ruling wholly fails to comply with the principles of neutrality. The equipment of British merchant vessels with artillery is for the purpose of making armed resistance against German cruisers." The United States replied on November 7th, 1914, that " this government considers that in permitting a private vessel having a general cargo, a customary amount of fuel, an average crew, and passengers of both sexes on board, and carrying a small armament and a small amount of ammunition, to enjoy the hospitality of an American port, it is in no way violating its duty as a neutral."

The submarine as a commerce destroyer had not yet been heard from. The official correspondence shows no further reference to the status of armed merchantmen until the Lusitania exchange. The first German note, dated May 28th, 1915, attempted in part to justify the attack on the Lusitania because the ship " had guns on board which were mounted under decks and masked." Our second Lusitania note of June 9th, 1915, asserted that " the Lusitania was not armed for offensive action." Then followed the long negotiations in which Germany finally conceded the principle of visit and search.

The effect was that our government had committed itself to two irreconcilable positions: first, that a merchant ship must be stopped and the passengers saved before it may be sunk; second, that a merchant ship may be armed for " defensive purposes." But a six-inch gun which could be considered as defensive against a cruiser might unquestionably be offensive against a submarine. The British had assured us that their ships would not attack first; the Germans had assured us that they would not sink without warning. We accepted both assurances, but Great Britain scorns the German promise, and Germany scorns the British promise. Neither accepts the assurances which the United States has accepted. It was this that led Secretary Lansing on January 18th, 1916, to address his circular note to the Entente, asking it to disarm ships in accordance with the promises which the United States had obtained from Germany. Germany then threw the fat into the fire by saying that after March 1st it would act as if Secretary Lansing's suggestion were in force as international law.

It is a dismal outlook. Secretary Lansing, by suggesting a reversal of the American position taken so positively in 1914, has given away the case to the Germans, and has made the safety of non-combatants hang upon the determination of the Allies to arm their ships and upon the guess of a particular submarine commander about a particular ship's armament. Yet the fairness of his proposal can hardly be questioned, nor that it is in accord with the spirit if not the letter of international law. Armed merchant ships are capable of offensive action against submarines. If the Allies refuse to accept his suggestion they are virtually admitting that they intend to attack submarines, and that a guarantee obtained by our government is not a good enough guarantee. Yet theoretically the whole force of the United States is behind the German guarantee. The Allies either do not believe that we would act to hold Germany to her promise—a belief for which our diplomacy has given some cause—or they are determined to use merchant ships to destroy submarines.

There are several courses possible, no one of which is pleasant. We can wash our hands of responsibility for the safety of armed ships. That seems to have been the earlier intention of the administration. It would mean precious little freedom of the seas for American travellers. We can stand pat, withdraw our suggestion to the Allies, and take the risk of war with Germany, because she refuses to treat armed merchant ships under the old rule of international law. That seems to be the present intention of the administration. We should then be liable to get into war for a principle which our State Department had publicly admitted was unsound. Both alternatives are dangerous and possibly humiliating, and if our government is to

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emerge from the tangle, all its wisdom and ingenuity will be needed. The situation seems to require a new interpretation of what constitutes "defensive armament," but the only authority capable of making such an interpretation authoritative would be a conference of all the Powers, including the belligerents. The government of the United States, as in so many other cases, is being asked to enforce at its own cost a rule of law about which a real ambiguity exists, and which is being used by both groups of belligerents as an immediate weapon against their enemies. Under such circumstances our government is surely justified in considering what the intrinsic merits of the controversy are and what its own position should be as a matter of policy as well as of law. It is also justified in considering what the consequences would be of assuming an inimical attitude towards either group of belligerents. The idea of seriously embarrassing the Allies in the prosecution of the war is intolerable. In so far as the government is forced to interpret an ambiguous rule of law at its own discretion, it certainly must not exercise its discretion so as to involve any danger of collision with France and Great Britain.

Army Programs

ONLY the confirmed anti-patriot can view with complacency the disorganization and dissolution of what capable leadership might have made the sanest preparedness movement in our history. Events no one can explain away had demonstrated that our stage of national isolation is closed. Our prosperity is bound up with our foreign relations; our safety is dependent upon forces many of which originate beyond our boundaries. The European war has not created this situation. It has not increased the dangers that threaten us. But it has made evident to everyone who thinks at all that during the last generation we have been living in a fool's paradise, fancying ourselves secure when we were really helpless. It is not hysteria that demands preparedness now; it is a readiness to learn by experience which, thanks to our luck, costs us nothing.

Potentially we are a powerful military nation. We have the men, the money, the industrial power, the inventiveness, the engineering skill that, assembled and organized, would give us a place among the strongest powers in the world. Our geographical situation is a military asset of incalculable value. Countries like Germany, France and Russia must be in condition to summon all their resources within a space of weeks. They cannot be adequately prepared without keeping immense bodies of men continually under arms. Militarism or defencelessness is the choice forced upon them. Our problem is entirely different. A hostile Power would encounter a considerable delay in clearing the seas of our navy, preparatory to an invasion. And even with this accomplished, the physical difficulty of transporting and landing an expeditionary force equipped for modern warfare would produce further delays. We do not need an army large enough to cope with the maximum invading force that a foreign power could land tomorrow if the seas were clear. We need an army that can, in two or three months, attain to sufficient strength to repel such an invading force. Thus we should be assured time to transmute all our potential military resources into actual resources. We should count as a great military Power in the councils of the world without incurring the political and financial costs of militarism.

It is the conviction of military experts that no Power would attempt to invade American soil with less than four or five hundred thousand men. No one has been able to show ground for believing that any Power, with the possible exception of England, is in a position to transport larger forces than these across either the Atlantic or the Pacific, in a period brief enough to make it impossible for us to gather our reserve forces. And any power undertaking to invade us would leave a safe margin for contingencies. It is folly to throw anything less than an overwhelmingly superior force into a distant land. If we had an army which could be built up in two or three months to a footing of four or five hundred thousand men, trained and equipped according to the best modern standards, any project of invasion would become chimerical. We should be insured against wanton aggression directed toward ourselves, and our protests in behalf of weaker nations threatened by wanton aggression would become effective as they can never be so long as we have to tremble at thought of invasion.

We do not need four or five hundred thousand men constantly under arms. We do need an equivalent number of trained men whom we can call to arms in the period of time at our disposal. Except for the believers in disarmament, there is scarcely anyone who questions the advisability of providing ourselves with a force of this magnitude. The questions really at issue among believers in preparedness are questions of organization. Shall we have an increased peace footing, with a comparatively short term with the colors and a long term with the reserve, or shall we maintain the regular army on its present basis of long terms and reënlistment, with auxiliary forces of state militia?

To enlarge the regular army and introduce the principle of a reserve has the disadvantage of involving a considerable increase in the military budget. We should need 200,000 men serving for two years with the colors and five years with

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the reserve to produce an adequate defensive force. It is not possible to get the kind of men required under the present terms of payment. A man who may be expected after two years of service to resume his civil occupation will not be attracted by fifteen dollars a month. Make the pay twenty-five dollars, and hosts of young men will see no disadvantage in devoting, say, their twentieth and twenty-first years to the service. This item of increased expense, however, is not so great as at first appears. Ten dollars a month additional pay for 200,000 men is only $24,000,000—not more than a small fraction of the total cost of adequate preparedness. Reservists, though restored to civil life, would have to be paid enough to compensate for losses and inconveniences attendant upon the annual manoeuvres. Their value would be worth many times the cost.

Though this plan is expensive, it would give us a defensive force upon which we could count with certainty. Two years of active service would be adequate, though no more than adequate, to train men in the handling of field artillery, of which we should need a quite disproportionate strength as compared with European armies. The institution of annual manoeuvres of active army and reserve would give our superior officers the experience in handling large masses of men, in which they are now lacking.

The alternative plan of leaving the regular army practically on its present footing and relying in emergencies upon the state militia has nothing to recommend it but its cheapness, and even this quality is delusive if the result is measured in terms of efficiency. Some of the state organizations are excellent, if allowance is made for the difficulties under which they labor. With liberal federal subsidies and federal control, it might be possible to improve the personnel and equipment of the organizations now below grade. But the federal government cannot prescribe qualifications for officers equivalent to those that ought to obtain in any seriously intended military organization. Nor can it require rigorous training for men to whom the service is merely incidental to other occupations. Federal regulation must be limited to what the state organizations will accept, or else the federal subsidy must be so heavy as to dispel the illusion of economy. Whatever actual military strength the nation can obtain through the National Guard is certain to be dear at best, and in view of the National Guard's political influence it is the safest assumption that money appropriated to the state militia will accomplish nothing worth while. Our militia strength has always been paper strength, and such is likely to be its character in future. It is for the foes, not the friends, of military efficiency to coquette with the state organizations.

Real Estate and the City Plan

DESPITE the enthusiasm of architects and the social reformers, it long ago became evident that individualistic America was not likely to see any general movement towards city-planning until the health, safety, and welfare of the city ceased to conflict with the private interests of landed property. The principles of city-planning were not likely even to be understood unless private interest came to see that itself as well as the city as a whole would be benefited. The city plan would have to cease to be a grandiose scheme of embellishment or the mere design for an elaborate civic center. It would have to become a synthetic scheme for regulating street traffic, building, industry, rail and water communication, recreational and educational facilities, housing conditions, in a way that demonstrated the city as a healthy organism, all its parts nourishing and stimulating one another.

City-planning hung in the air as long as the real estate interests were opposed to it or thought of it as esoteric and impractical. A comprehensive city plan is a challenge to the property owner, and as long as our laws give him protection against the community, organized opposition on his part can defeat such proposals. The conversion of the real estate interests to city-planning is the crux of the whole movement. A document like the recent "Report of the Advisory Council of the Real Estate Interests in New York City" is therefore of the utmost significance. It may mark a definite turning of the tide. It is an almost complete reversal of the attitude of ten years ago, when the first limitation of the heights of buildings in Boston excited real-estate rage as an attack on the rights of the free-born American citizen. Real estate has now, it seems, turned against its own skyscraper. It admits that the "present almost unrestricted power to build to any height has resulted in injury to real estate and business interests, and to the health, safety and general welfare of the city." It admits that "light, air and access, the chief factors in fixing rentable values, have been impaired by high buildings and by the proximity of inappropriate or nuisance buildings and uses." Here it is quite at one with the public. These are exactly the things which the community is interested in keeping unimpaired and which the intelligently planned city does keep unimpaired. "A certain degree of order and uniformity in building development is desirable from the point of view of public safety and welfare, and is essential to the safety and prosperity of real estate interests." This is a far cry from the spirit which has built our chaotic cities—the fierce insistence on the right of every man to build as he liked on his own property. The most Europe-obsessed town-

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planner could scarcely ask more than this new maxim of real estate interests.

It is less surprising that this light should have dawned in New York, for that city of recent years has had a bad scare in the devastation of the Fifth Avenue neighborhood by workshop lofts. This lesson of municipal control has been learned at the price of the wholesale impairment of real estate values throughout parts of the mercantile district. The real estate interests discovered that one of the chief factors in property value was security of investment, and that there is no security where such things can happen. Unless some assurance is obtained that the character of the district will be reasonably maintained and undesirable neighbors not allowed to intrude, their property will turn out to be almost as little their own as if it were subject to confiscation by the most autocratic government. They have found that volatile light industry, which is free from any segregating force and may roam indiscriminately about the city, constitutes a permanent menace to private interests as well as to all the public municipal values that make a city desirable or fit to live in. Every American city is strewn with stagnant pools of obsolescent buildings and unimproved property, with the accompanying moribund land values, all of which might have been saved by an intelligent city plan. And the real estate interests have found how impotent are private protective organizations, like the Fifth Avenue Association in New York, to prevent the invasion and destruction and obsolescence.

As a result of this experience the "Report of the Real Estate Interests" calls for severe restriction. To prevent this anarchy of values the city is frankly called upon "to do for the individual owners what they cannot do for themselves—set up uniform restrictions, that will protect each against his neighbor and redound to the benefit of all." It would be difficult to imagine a more concise surrender to the principle of city-planning. City-planning has taken its place in the great movement towards public control of private enterprise for the purpose not of strangling private interest, but of increasing its effectiveness. A city plan becomes a sort of "union" to raise the communal building "standard of living." And the public has the same interest in the success of such unionization that it has in the organization of labor, for not only are the unionized protected against demoralization, the entire community is protected as well.

Equally significant is the fact that this New York report is not a mere private invention of realty experts, but follows in detail the recommendations of the Municipal Heights of Buildings Commission and the Board of Estimate Committee on the City Plan. This committee, of which Mr. George B. Ford, one of the leading town-planning experts in this country, is consultant, has been engaged for some time on a comprehensive districting plan for the city, as well as upon gigantic schemes of traffic regulation, the measurement and planning of transit facilities, the coördination of transit and shipping facilities, and the study of the probable development of the city's great tracts of unsettled land. The districting which the report advises involves the restricting of residential districts from which business and industry will be excluded, and of business districts from which objectional trades and industries and the larger type of factory will be excluded. Districts are also to be provided which limit the height of buildings to a varying multiple of the street width. In thus supporting the districting plan the Advisory Council of Real Estate Interests seems in the way of committing itself to the most far-reaching and scientific piece of city-planning which is being undertaken in America.

The districting is one of the minimum requirements of the city plan. It is a basis for all future development. Out of the utilitarian soil aesthetic values are sure to grow. Uniformity of purpose in buildings makes for harmony of design. Owners may find, as public taste improves, that ugliness is a nuisance and a factor in the depreciation of values. They will also find that many other factors besides restriction are necessary to make values stable—the development of transit, the character of adjacent districts, the intelligent direction of the city's growth. They will discover that the city is an organism and that its health and efficiency are matters of right relations between its parts and its functions. They will see that the comprehensive city plan is indispensable to the slow recovery from the present maladjustments, and to the prevention of more costly maladjustments in the future.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1916, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

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YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION, FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE.

REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER. ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

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Integrated America

MR. GARRISON'S resignation exposes a condition which close observers of Congress have suspected for some time. When the administration plans for the army were brought to the Capitol they were laid on the table and left to cool. Almost immediately the scheme began to crumble, and Congressmen representing every kind of party interest could be seen crawling through the cracks in it, carrying little crumbs back to their own districts. No one but Mr. Garrison seemed much interested in the plan as a whole, for to think of the plan as a whole was to think in terms of the nation, and few Congressmen do. So there was never much interest in the Continental army, not because the plan was regarded as unpracticable, but because it conflicted with state pride, the militia interests, and because there was nothing in it for "my district."

But the alternative was alluring: federal aid to the local militias. That was comprehensible. There was something in that. No matter that forty-eight separate militias are an absurdity for a nation. It promised to open another pork barrel, to add the militia to pensions, rivers and harbors, public buildings. Mr. Garrison's own horizon was national, and he really desired an effective result. He would not endure a sham rigged on corruption, and the challenge he offered the President was that the President assert the nation's interest as against that of localities, states' rights, the militias' rights and the little Congressmen. Mr. Wilson answered with an "open mind," which seemed to mean that he was not willing to risk an open fight with Congress.

Mr. Garrison had led Mr. Wilson to the edge of that struggle in which all Presidents with a national vision have to take part. He had asked him to lead the nation against local and private interests. Mr. Wilson hesitated. It is not enough to say that this hesitation reveals the weakness of the President. The fact that every executive, be he Roosevelt, Taft, or Wilson, has sooner or later to split with Congress is a fact that is deeper than personalities or party politics. It arises because our vivid interests are still local and private in scope. Almost every national project, whether of defense or conservation or tariff legislation, finally breaks its head upon this stubborn and aggressive localism. The evil of localism is a very radical evil, so radical that it frustrates practically all effort to reform anything, from the army to the civil service. Most reformers are in the end driven to fight it. Naturally they have looked about for leadership.

For a time it seemed that the Progressives might furnish the leadership. But the minor leaders of that party were in a panic of eagerness to get back into the Republican party, so they went to Chicago last January, made a shabby little smirk of an excuse about "social justice," announced boldly that they were patriots, and sold themselves to the Republicans for nothing. They were fatuous enough to suppose that they could line up this country on the issue of "Americanism"; that they could make the Republicans seem pro- and the Democrats anti-American. In the excitement no one was to notice that they had scuttled.

Their chief, Mr. Roosevelt, has done better. He has kept his outlines sharp, and he has expressed a real vision. Through many of Mr. Roosevelt's utterances it is possible to detect a new conception of the state and of the obligations of citizenship.

Behind Mr. Roosevelt in the last months has been the general feeling that the United States can no longer be irresponsible in the world, that it must have a foreign policy clearly defined and realistic in method, that its industrial life must be organized from out of its chaos and waste, that the population cannot be allowed to disintegrate into its European elements, that citizenship is a much firmer duty than it ever was, and that in general there must be an end to the slack and thoughtlessness and drift of our national life. The war has given large numbers of Americans a new instinct for order, purpose, discipline. These Americans are distressed at the local selfishness and blind individualism of the United States. They feel that modern life requires a people screwed up to a higher pitch of devotion and forethought. It is from this sentiment, strongest, I imagine, on the Atlantic seaboard and in some of the big cities, that Mr. Roosevelt has been drawing his strength.

The sentiment has never been crystallized into ideas, much less into a popular political program. Mr. Roosevelt undertook to crystallize it. But what happened to the impulse which was to change the character of America, after it had passed through Mr. Roosevelt's conscience? Admitting that Mr. Roosevelt has to paint with a large brush, the ideas which he advertises are immersed in a confusion of phrases about honor, patriotism, righteousness, on-the-one-hand-on-the-other-handedness. He had and probably has in mind a revolutionary conception of what America should be. But when he set out to explain it he explained little but his con-

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tempt for Mr. Wilson and his command over epithets of scorn. He rarely got out of the rut of purely conventional moral judgment, with its attendant phrases about shame and honor and manliness. The result is that Mr. Roosevelt can be pocketed by the very simple method of refusing to let him sing a solo about Americanism. Everyone can join in the chorus, and the fact that one vocalist is a little louder than the rest is hardly a distinction.

Mr. Roosevelt has failed to create a living issue in domestic politics for Progressives or Republicans. He has failed not for lack of opportunity, but because he did not take time to realize it. He had a splendid impulse at hand, just the raw material for statesmanship: a people shocked by war, dimly aware that they were inadequate; a large and powerful group half-inspired by the vision of a more purposeful America; an opposition party almost incapable of national action. To make a genuine use of this material Mr. Roosevelt would have had to waste less energy in bitterness towards Mr. Wilson and the pacifists, and spend a great deal more on the workmanship of his ideas.

It is not his purpose which is at fault, but his method. In this supreme moral crisis the group he is working with have been guilty of a most discouraging failure of imagination and clumsiness of technique. They are recognizing more clearly than ever before the vices of the American character, its trust in the magic of words, its collective irresponsibility, its shirking of facts and the harder realities of life. They are deeply impressed with the precise and synthesized organization of Germany. An increasing number of Americans are out of sorts with our straggling democracy, in which freedom without high purpose has become a corruption; with Congress, in which no coherent program of reconstruction is possible because Congress is a convention of local interests engaged primarily in scooping things out of the pork barrel; with our diplomacy, which uses words without underwriting the costs; with the general slouchiness and distraction of the public morale.

Conscious of the evils to which reformers have pointed for years, Mr. Roosevelt and his followers looked about for a remedy. They fixed upon compulsory military training. They do not say America needs conscription for military purposes, but that it needs it to redeem its spiritual life. The theory is that if the whole male population could be passed for a definite period through the same discipline, subjected to the same sacrifices, we should be welded into a more homogenous and accurate people. By being run all through the same hopper we should be squeezed and cut into a nation. We need education, and here is the machine to give it to us.

It is a wholesale and mechanical solution for a real problem, a case of good vision frustrated by bad technique. For it is clear that if years of compulsory education have not disciplined us, six months of military drill will not do it. Our conscriptionists are novices in education. At the very moment when teachers are discovering that discipline and responsibility cannot be produced by blind obedience to superiors, military enthusiasts are in haste to embrace the discarded theory and to educate a people through the drillmaster.

There is a deeper failure in this approach to the problem. Assume that the Swiss military system would really produce the utopia promised. The fact remains that short of the gravest national danger the system cannot be adopted in the United States. England in the midst of a terrible war has hardly dared to adopt conscription. In peaceful America, with the exceptional isolation of our people, the scheme is fantastic. The propagandists are impressed because the idea of conscription has made headway. Let them not deceive themselves. It has made headway among an insignificant minority. The opposition has not been felt because the American people do not regard the idea as a serious possibility. The propagandists, of course, meet many people who agree with them, and this gives them the illusion of success. But the trouble is that they meet mainly the people who agree with them. All propagandists do.

It is argued that if the idea is a good one, men ought to stand for it whether it is practical or not, but the question to be asked is why the scheme is not practical. I think the answer will be that the American people are too separatist and too much devoted to getting on for any such sacrifice to ideal educational purposes. In other words, the very vices which compulsion is designed to cure will prevent it from being adopted. Granting that compulsion would be good for America, it is a remedy that Americans would not adopt unless they were convinced of its value. They would have to grasp the vision, realize their own faults, and have the collective energy to change their whole traditional view of life. If they could do that, compulsion would hardly be necessary. We should be such a realistic and imaginative people that six months' drill would add little to our abundant virtues. Compulsion will not be adopted for its alleged spiritual by-products. It may be adopted to prevent an invasion. If we were an autocracy it might be imposed by a benevolent despot. But to expect a democracy like ours to accept it as an educational program is to assume that the virtues desired already exist. If they did exist we should not need to stop at anything so meagre as military training. We should be able to construct a national system of education of in-

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comparable depth and richness, and make a real start towards a purposeful democracy. The kind of result aimed at by Mr. Roosevelt and his followers cannot be achieved by shouting people into it or by what looks like a nice, simple, logical, wholesale device. Neither method has been employed by creative statesmen who in the past have drawn their people to a larger allegiance.

What Mr. Roosevelt is trying to do, in a phrase, is to intensify the nationalization of America. He is aiming to draw Americans out of their local, group, class, and ethnic loyalties into a greater American citizenship. That is a mighty thing to attempt, for every time we increase the area of vivid and practical loyalty we take a step toward decreasing the friction of mankind. We shall learn world-citizenship, if at all, in the school of graded experience when the object of loyalty is constantly being enlarged. To be able to grasp and work for a political unit as varied as the United States or the British Empire is to have made a great move out of provincialism.

The problem Mr. Roosevelt has set himself has arisen before in American history. Alexander Hamilton dealt with it when he set himself to unify a districted people, to create a loyalty larger than the states'. His task was if anything more delicate, for the habit of association was hardly formed. He did not resort to rhetoric nor trust to a mechanical panacea. He had too much imagination and too good sense of technique to spoil a great purpose with careless methods. In Hamilton's stupendous success Mr. Roosevelt and his friends may read a lesson, for their inspiration is to carry on the work which Hamilton began.

The men who made a Union out of discordant colonies and a privately-minded people, suffered from few of the illusions which affect their successors to-day. They did not suppose they could unify a people and create a strong government by waving flags or preaching the value of self-sacrifice. They knew that there were a thousand reasons why union was desirable, why an efficient authority was needed, why a national allegiance should absorb merely local patriotism. They were in actual danger not only of war between the states but of interference from Europe. There was every reason imaginable why Hamilton and Washington should have been able to persuade the Constitution into existence and to keep it going through its inherent usefulness. Yet Hamilton was too knowing ever to build his edifice out of such fragile material. He put "America first" by attaching to the new government such a weight of financial and commercial interest that the most powerful citizens were enlisted for the Union. By his great fiscal measures, the funding of the debt, the assumption of the state debts and the National Bank act, he created a powerful class of enthusiastic federalists. He brought into existence a class of people whose incomes depended upon the Union, who worked for the Union, who were the actual government. It is no exaggeration to say that the Constitution would have been nothing but sham if it had not embodied the interests of groups large enough and able enough to preserve it. The ideal values of American union grew out of the most solid and dependable of human motives. That is why they survived.

The scholar who has brought these truths home with patient detail is Professor Charles Beard. (See "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States," and "Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy.") Many readers have cried out in pain at his "revelations." Yet all that Professor Beard has proved is that Hamilton was a great architect of human society who employed materials suited to the strain, and was not an evangelist or a romanticist about government. No sounder tribute could be paid to Hamilton than to say that he knew "the government could not stand if its sole basis was the platonic support of genial well-wishers. He knew that it had been created in response to interested demands and not out of any fine-spun theories of political science." The men around him seem to have kept in mind the simple truth that Constitutions are not worth the paper they are written on unless there are men interested in preserving them; and that the way to create governments is to attach to them powerful groups. Thus in 1790 Oliver Wolcott, Jr., writes: "I can consider the funding system as important in no other respect than as an engine of government . . . unless some active principle of the human mind can be interested in the support of the government, no civil establishments can be formed which will not appear like useless and expensive pageants. . . ." And these men were forging a union and creating a nation. They were doing a work which it is the intention of Mr. Roosevelt and his followers to carry forward.

Nor is Professor Beard the only historian to insist upon the *Realpolitik* of American union. Some years ago an Englishman, Mr. Frederick Scott Oliver, published a life of Alexander Hamilton which is one of the noblest biographies in our language. Mr. Oliver is also the author of "Ordeal by Battle," a book much read to-day in England and America, and referred to recently by Mr. Roosevelt with enthusiastic approval. Mr. Oliver wrote about Hamilton not only because he admired him, but because he wished to study the American union in order to get some light on the puzzling problems of British imperialism. Mr. Oliver has no taint of

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the muckraker in him. He has the grandiose manner, and he doesn't like to talk about trade if he can help it; but he is too honest to blink at the facts, and so we find him writing: "In his treatment of the debt Hamilton was not concerned merely with the honour of his country, nor did he regard the matter only with the merchant's eye to the advantages of good credit in case of further troubles. His measures were something more than financial. They had a deliberate political intention. . . . the political object of his financial policy was to bind the moneyed classes firmly to the central government; to induce them to look to that quarter for the security of their capital and the punctuality of their dividends; to fix their interests in it rather than in the state governments."

How tremendous was the force which Hamilton enlisted in the cause of union can be grasped when we realize that a competent observer of the period estimated the debt as more than one-fourth of the whole volume of property in the United States. In Massachusetts, says Professor Beard, the public securities more than equalled the amount of money loaned at interest. Had Hamilton failed to attach such power to the Union, it is hardly conceivable that a strong central government could have been established. The greatness of his mind is not that he designed a balanced Constitution, but that he never neglected to use the interests which were alone capable of realizing it. That is what we mean by constructive statesmanship, and we may well ask what there is in Mr. Roosevelt's present program which shows the same instinct for realities.

Mr. Roosevelt is preaching Americanism, which means a more closely-knit nation. Is he offering anything which is really fit to accomplish that purpose? Has he proposed anything comparable to Hamilton's magnificently radical conception? We can ignore the preaching; it has its uses, but Mr. Roosevelt himself has taught us to be wary of words not backed by deeds. There are, to be sure, in Mr. Roosevelt's utterances, a certain number of vague footnotes about justice to everybody, about " laws " for labor, shippers, farmers, business men; there are allusions to the " control " and " encouragement " of industry. He has urged federal incorporation. But nowhere do his ideas even begin to assume the design, the incomparable realism, of Hamilton's fiscal measure. There remains the program of military service. This falls to the ground for the reason that it does not rest on necessity, and is merely put forward because it is such a fine idea. Inasmuch as no scheme of compulsory training has yet been proposed which can enlist the support of the workingmen, farmers, small business men, women voters, and new immigrants who are the bulk of the nation, it is an ideal in a vacuum. Yet the intention of Mr. Roosevelt is one that we shall have to comprehend. I do not mean all his intentions. I mean his basic vision of a more highly organized nation in which the great mass of the population lives a national rather than a local life, in which we become more than ever a union of people rather than a congeries of groups, provinces, and racial stocks. To fulfill that intention is not easy. It will never be fulfilled by some easy little mechanical device. To integrate America will require a daring construction, and a long and desperate struggle.

What Mr. Roosevelt needs is an economic program at least as comprehensive as Hamilton's, which will attract the interest of the great mass of the population to the national government. We are to-day a scattered people because we have a scattered industrial system. Our government is weak in the affection of the people because it is a weak government, because it rarely touches their lives, because it does not protect them, because it is still something distant and unimportant. The great reality for most Americans is still the locality where they dwell, the industry or farm where they get their living. National loyalty is so generally a phrase without obligation because the national power is so much of an abstraction. If Mr. Roosevelt is to give concrete meaning to his ideal of Americanism he will have to look about for a social program which will make America real to the most distant by appealing to their lives and enlisting their hopes.

Anyone who is trying to get Congress to adopt a national project is likely to find himself balked by the intensity of local feeling. In its worst form this particularism appears as the pork-barrel, but that is not its only form. States' rights, provincial patriotism, sectional interests, not only stand in the way of an adequate military program; they obfuscate issues like conservation and the control of industry. This local-mindedness is cut across by a still graver kind of disunion—the divisions of class and clique. No one supposes that any measures now within the realm of statesmanship can obliterate the hostility and rivalry of sections and groups. Hamilton with all his genius achieved merely a working union, not an ideal union. What we have to aim at is plans that will wed larger and larger masses of Americans to the federal government, and allay the worst forms of suspicion which hinder national action.

Without a railroad system Americans scattered through so immense a territory could not coöperate at all. We should be a collection of deaf and dumb communities, much like China or Russia, in which the mass of people would never think or act effectively as a nation. The railroads, as their publicity men tell us, have become the chief source of Amer-

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ican unity. They reach out into the most obscure village and destroy the sense of distance. When a man wishes to take a vacation and "get out of America," he hunts up a place not on the railroad. When a little town secures connection with some trunk line it feels as if it had been absorbed into the nation's life.

Yet just because the railroads play so large a part in welding us together, they are also capable of setting us against one another. The power to make rates is the power to discriminate between communities. Over this power a tremendous struggle goes on. Some sections are well served, others poorly, and as a result the railroads are a source of great sectional rivalry in the United States. States' rights has taken on a new intensity owing to the effort of different sections to regulate railroads in their own interest. There has developed a tangle of local conflicts due to the fact that state commissions try to bend the management of railroads in the interests of a particular locality. This rivalry exists because American railroads are not operated as a unit but as competing systems. The effect of the conflicts is to disorganize American political thought, for they align business men against each other, and deepen particularist as against national habits. The pork-barrel is in many ways a minor sign of this deeper disunion.

Because we cannot operate our railroads as a unified national service, we cannot undertake any thorough military preparedness, we cannot coördinate our industrial resources, we cannot really control business in the interests of the nation. There can be no thorough plan of economic development because the government has no positive leverage upon it. Not only reformers but the wiser railroad men are beginning to see that the railway problem is becoming constantly more "impossible." They recognize that rate-making is a public function, yet it can never be satisfactory or tolerably fair under existing conditions. It is plain that you cannot make an equal rate for two systems one of which has long hauls and the other short. The same rate is almost certain to be excessive for one road and too small for the other. Under a unified system this difficulty would not arise, since the excess earned by one part could be applied to the deficiencies of another part.

The same problem arises in regard to wages. The railroads to-day face the most powerful unions in America. A prosperous road may be able to meet their demands, while a poor road cannot. Moreover, these unions, which represent the skilled workers, are becoming so great an interest that private railway management cannot cope with them. It is fairly clear that wage-making on the railroads will have to become a public function. But wages can never be regulated fairly for competing railroads. The roads must operate as a unit if equal wages are not to prove an impossible burden.

With rates and wages, safety appliances, kinds of service, and what-not regulated by the government, private railroad initiative has all but disappeared. What remains is the worst feature of private management—the fact that the railroads are not one national system over which burdens can be distributed according to needs. And the responsibility is divided. Neither the railroad executives, nor the government, nor the unions have that essential of good administration—the combination of responsibility with power.

This profound disorganization at the very heart of our industrial life is the opportunity of the statesman who wishes to integrate America. The political leader who has the vision to see that to nationalize America he must first nationalize the railroads will be the man who has taken a step towards realizing Mr. Roosevelt's intentions. To transfer to the federal government the management of the nineteen billion dollars of capital in the country's most vital industry would do more than any other thing to make us a nation. The interests of the national government would then be unmistakably superior to those of the states and private interests. The government would then have the instrument and the power for controlling and stimulating business. By its control of rates and railroad development it could coördinate industry, and there would be created a very large class of bondholders, employees, shippers, executives, whose immediate interests were national rather than local.

The obvious objection is that our government is too inefficient to operate so great an industry. To be sure it already controls all vital operations, exercising power without responsibility, but the real answer is that efficiency grows from practice and need. Give a great enough number of people a vital interest in railroad efficiency, and if you have any faith in the American character you must believe that they will develop that efficiency. Railroad nationalization would make efficiency a moral issue in American politics, because the evils of inefficiency would be felt in every corner of the Union. Only in some such great enterprise can Americans be expected to learn their most needed lessons: that a successful democracy must have a powerful government, that it must be a government which touches their lives if they are to cherish it, that it must be the custodian of interests so great that inefficiency and waste and the lack of public spirit are crimes against the state. It is hard to see how Americans can develop national responsibility in any other way than by assuming it.

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It is necessary to admit, I think, that we have today no practical plan which solves the conflict centering around the working-class. Even if a plan existed, our disorganization is at present too great for any prospect of success. But a plan is possible which meets the worst evils from which the workers suffer, a plan which would give them greater security, greater share in the government, a discipline in coöperation, and a sense that they lived in a nation which did not ignore them. To pretend to more than this would be to offer them a delusion or a snare.

A statesman interested in the integration of America must realize some proposal which will give human warmth to the national government, which will make federal power mean not only abstract legislation, not only inspection, commissions and other instruments which are alien and forbidding. If the people are to weave their affections into the structure of the nation the government must be able to reach them in sickness and in sorrow, in misfortune and in old age. A really imaginative program of Americanization must include a comprehensive, nation-wide system of health, accident, maternity, old age and unemployment insurance. If such a system is devised so that it is coöperatively administered, the nation would be expected to accumulate so much experience in self-government, so much good-will, and provide so great a demonstration of what the state means and might mean, that a real impulse would have been given towards efficiency and discipline and a synthesized people. Under that stimulus we should find the will and the knowledge to nationalize education, and prepare ourselves not merely for military responsibilites but for all other necessities which are frustrated by the chaos and suspicion of our life.

No doubt this is a radical program to offer Mr. Roosevelt and the Progressives, but they are trying to deal with a radical situation. To many reformers, on the other hand, it may seem tame. It would not be tame, once it were made a political issue; and the effects of so courageous a scheme would be unending. In revolutionary importance it is comparable to Hamilton's financial program on which the Union was founded. The program suggested may not meet our need, but anything less comprehensive in spirit will prove, I think, to be just nothing at all, a mass of phrases and aspirations without substance. Yet nationalized railroads and national insurance are in themselves empty ideas unless they are formulated for action, exploited by leaders who can reach the people, and realized by men with at least some of Hamilton's ingenuity and practical wisdom. If Mr. Roosevelt and the Progressives are to play the role which their impulse indicates, they would have to do more than " come out " for such a program. They would have to see that it was not a plank in a platform, but the essence of their best vision. They would have to make it their own with the same fervor that they are now pouring into military preparedness alone. This is the dwelling of which armament is merely a façade.

There is no way of knowing whether Mr. Roosevelt and his followers have it in them to undertake this kind of statesmanship. But this much at least is certain: more than any other political group they are capable of grasping the vision, more than any others they have made a start in this direction. In fact, Mr. Roosevelt is the only national leader who in our time has represented this insight. That is the political meaning of his rich and abounding personality. That is why he survives every defeat, why the springs of his energy are constantly renewed. That is why we cannot stop talking about him. He is forever tantalizing us with the hope that we have in him a leader equal to our needs. If he is that leader he will translate his phrases about America and about patriotism into some great national project. It will require courage and imagination and skill. It will raise an opposition as bitter as that which fought Hamilton. But if he means what he is preaching to us, he will not delude himself into the belief that the defeat of Mr. Wilson, the use of rhetoric, and the threat of thundering deeds is the true path to an integrated America.

WALTER LIPPMANN.

Commonplaces on Poetry

ONE would have said that no form of art requires less explanation than verse, that almost everybody knows what a poem is, by right of having ears. Yet now people are quarreling about this very matter, apparently unable to find any common ground on which to make themselves plain to one another. The hot emotions aroused and the inventions born in the conflict will perhaps add more to experience than any analysis which might resolve the disagreements; but impartial curiosity has its passion too, and the futile peacemaker is as irrepressible as the warrior. It is inevitable that somebody should say again about poetry a few elementary things which may have been misunderstood for the very reason that they were taken for granted.

A few years ago most lovers of poetry held a light opinion of contemporary verse. What was being written seemed to consist merely of lines and phrases of pretty design, printed in magazines by the inch to plug holes at the end of stories, and of much the same decorative quality as the tailpieces for which it was substituted. It patently had tra-

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ditional outlines, little form and less substance. Mild and genteel, it seemed made especially for parlors, like the contemporaneous vases of curly or spindling china and colored glass, the onyx, silk-shaded lamps which stood on tables covered with gold-threaded cloths put on cornerwise and hanging in tasseled splendor, the statuettes which if not gilded were at least winged and of literary subjects. Watery morals, tinted moods, elaborate sentiments had tried to do the work of passion, and could not.

Now an honest man in the presence of such a clutter has a desire to smash things. At any cost he will be plain and blunt. He is likely to think that people have been paying too much attention to outline. It was thus that the revolt in the making of verse arose. Poets thought the lack of content had been due to the elaboration of shape. They spoke of poetry being shackled—as indeed it may be—but they forgot that in contemporary verse there had been little worthy of shackling. The souls of few of these pretty sonnets would have galloped to mountain tops even if they had been freed from their measured pace. But having laid the emphasis on shape, the revolutionaries began industriously to invent and defend freer and apparently simpler shapes, scorning traditional ornament and using clumsy honesty when it suited them.

The results have pleased some readers and offended others. The controversy has gone on as it was begun, largely as a discussion of outline. Poets have overlooked the fact that their original objection to current verse was its lack of content, and their new productions may have a different cause from the reasons they have advanced. Critics have compared generically the merits of *vers libre* and regular rhythms without reference to the sort of thing the creator of each has to say, or the way it has been said in each instance. Humorists have amused themselves by translating famous sonnets into free verse. A result no less ridiculous would have been obtained if somebody had rewritten a passage from " Paradise Lost " as a rondeau. Yet a rondeau, everyone admits, is a fine arrangement for certain kinds of sentiment. Anything claiming to be a work of art has a right to be judged as an entity, presumably with its own organic structure. You cannot fit one poem into another poem's skin any more than you can make a canary into a catbird. You cannot discover whether a production in free verse is spurious or genuine as a work of art simply by defending or rejecting standards of structure derived from other kinds of poetry. You must investigate the matter with some understanding of creative processes. You must feel, as the writer felt.

A work of art is produced in much the same way as is a living organism. Some objects come into being inertly, like a cookie stamped out of dough with a tin mould. These objects can be made or changed by drawing outlines, paring here and there at will. A living organism, on the other hand, is the result of a germ of life projected into an environment which, while it nourishes the organism and affects its growth, does not determine its nature. When anyone writes a real poem he begins not with the dough and the mould but with the germ. He does not say to himself, " Now I wish to write a sonnet; what shall I put into it? " He has an emotional concept, something he wishes to express. If this concept is to take any tangible form, it must have a body made of language. All the possible ways in which the writer could say anything serve as its environment. The poet must select, either consciously or subconsciously, those words, rhythms, images, which will enable his concept to live most effectively in language. The kind of body most appropriate for it, given the language, depends upon the kind of concept it is. The success with which the poet develops his concept towards this most appropriate form depends upon the range of expression he is master of, and his earnestness and skill in selecting from it. It is the sense of this process which enables us to criticize a work of art at all. Nobody can say that a six-pointed cookie is any more perfect than a circular cookie; but if you have a sense of the organic wholeness of a poem—its ideal form, so to speak—you can say: here the poet imperfectly expressed his emotion, and here he came nearer perfection.

No environment is fixed and definite for all time. That is one reason we cannot create once for all a perfect world full of perfect things and maintain it so. One field is better for clover, another for thistles; one age is better for mastodon, another for man. Language, too, is variable and progressive. It exists not as something absolute, but as a means of communication, dependent for its effectiveness on the common associations which it can arouse in the speaker and the listener. Your ideal form for a poem, therefore, can be only an ideal form for that given poem, written for a public of some homogeneity at a given time. Other publics can recognize its form only by so much as they can experience fully the language in which it has its being.

Suppose that a few sincere poets, using the language of their time, produce masterpieces. Suppose these masterpieces become institutions as they are handed on from library to library, their rhythms and images growing familiar to thousands of readers, and contributing to the language. Suppose nevertheless that the inexhaustible inventiveness of mankind is adding countless elements to experience

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which cannot help changing language as it is spoken, changing the rhythms heard outside of language, destroying elements of the old imagery and adding new elements from which imagery could be created. Certain old images and rhythms, robbed of their freshness by much repetition, can no longer represent anything but literary association. If a new poet arises who uses the new language at his hand, two things are bound to happen. Those who are more conscious of his language than of the traditional poetry will understand the new poet. Those who are more conscious of the traditional poetry than of the new language will be shocked or amused by him. They will not understand him until, either by the force of his personality or the force of circumstances, they are made familiar with his idiom.

Incidentally, too, if a writer employs new forms he arouses the old question of the distinction between prose and poetry. Any work of art which uses language, whether it be essay, story or play, is conceived and expressed in the way previously described. If the production turns out to be a sonnet, or blank verse, or a rhymed lyric, we are satisfied that it is poetry. But if it turns out to be something unfamiliar in irregular lines, we are likely to ask why it is called poetry instead of prose. Yet in a sense such a question is irrelevant. It cannot be answered except by common consent to use the term. The new writer may say: "Do you grant that this production is a genuine expression? Do you grant that I could not have produced my effect better in some other way? If so, it is all I wish. Call the form by any name if you like; the important thing to me is that I have created the right form in which to express what I felt. But I would remind you that in the past the definition of poetry has not been limited by traditional forms. The same question you raise was raised when rhyme was first used in poetry, again when the Elizabethans discarded rhyme in blank verse, again about the cacophonies of Robert Browning. No great age of poetry has been without its innovations."

And so, after all, the relevant questions are the obvious ones. Have the writers under discussion something real to say? Have the new forms arisen because the sort of thing they have to say is new? Or, if it is not new, have the new forms arisen because the writers, in trying to express whatever is in them, are making appropriate use of new elements and arangements of language? If so, we can take it for granted that the new forms may embody valid works of art. In the process of answering these questions, and only thus, can we intelligently examine the structure of the new forms, and distinguish critically among the poems that use them.

GEORGE SOULE.

The British Imperial Problem

(II) The Dependent Empire

MODERN British imperialism connotes an increasing desire for closer union between the self-governing communities of the Empire, and the pressing problem is to implement this feeling for solidarity with adequate institutions. But these democracies contain only about one-seventh of the Empire's total population, some sixty-odd millions of Caucasians, as opposed to 375,000,000 of other stocks elsewhere. The Dependent Empire with this huge congeries of all races and colors, of all degrees of civilization, with no common characteristic except the varying extent of their backwardness in the qualifications essential to self-government, likewise has its fundamental problem, and this has by no means been ignored. In fact, in the minds of many the chief argument in favor of an organic union of the democratic communities in the Empire is that only by joint efforts can their relations with the backward peoples be adjusted upon progressively equitable principles. Towards both sections of the Empire sentiment has changed radically in the past fifty years. Just as the Dominions are no longer viewed as dependencies or even as daughter-nations, but rather as partners and sister-nations, and loyalty to the Empire, not to England, is the sentiment that is expected, so in respect to the Dependent Empire, as Joseph Chamberlain has expressed it, "the sense of possession has given place to a different sentiment—the sense of obligation." But the fulfilment of these obligations to the growing mass of those still politically uneducated within the Empire, the inalienable historical legacy of a past actuated by different motives, must become increasingly difficult for the comparatively small population of the British Isles. Hence, it is argued, the Dominions that are being peopled by immigration from Britain should share in this burdensome responsibility which, more than all other political questions, calls for self-restraint and vision.

Although there are still sporadic vestiges of the old spirit, this sense of obligation has during the

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past half-century been dominant in the administration of the dependent communities. Of these the chief is British India, which, with its 315,000,000 people of different religions, races, and languages, has no greater inherent unity than has Europe. Under British rule remarkable economic progress has been made. A comprehensive railroad system has been created, extensive irrigation canals have been built, modern industries are gradually being established, and foreign commerce is expanding at a markedly rapid pace. But nowhere else, except possibly in Russia, is religion so vital a force; and the doctrine prevalent among Hindus that life is mere illusion, weakens the economic impulse and greatly retards the establishment of general economic well-being. Among the more specific obstacles to the attainment of this purpose, none is more serious than an annual increase of two millions in population, which tends to keep the standard of living stationary. Malthus's doctrines may be discredited in the West, but the East bears witness that they contain some measure of inexorable truth. Educational facilities, though from the Western standpoint still highly inadequate, have been provided on a rapidly expanding scale. In the decade from 1904 to 1913 the amount spent upon education increased twofold and the number receiving instruction rose from 4,900,000 to 7,200,000.

Although benevolent in its purposes and impartial and impersonal in its actions, the government is autocratic in form. Year by year, however, there is a more extensive reliance upon native talent to formulate its policies and to execute them. The civil service and courts are to a great extent in the hands of Indians, and they control the widespread system of local government that has been elaborated during the past thirty years. Seven years ago, under Lord Morley, the provincial legislative councils were so reconstituted as to give the non-official elective members a majority. The unrest in certain classes and sections in India is in itself a proof of progress, and the recklessly vehement diatribes against British rule by those whom Lord Cromer perhaps too sweepingly characterizes as "the esurient youth of the day" are the inevitable results of the ferment of Western education.

What is the ultimate goal in view? The newer school of imperialism, whose present purpose is to establish the relations of the Dominions and Great Britain upon a permanent basis, has clearly defined ideas on this point. According to them, the British Empire is one world-wide commonwealth, whose basic principle is that its citizens are dedicated to reciprocal service, and in whose government all that are fit shall take part and from which none that are fit shall be exempt. According to this view the fellah of Egypt, the Basuto of South Africa, the Hindu and Musulman of India, the Australasian and the Canadian are all bound together in a "bond of infinite obligation" by their common citizenship in one commonwealth, and the only differences between them arise from the fact that all are not as yet capable of taking part in formulating the law which rules over them all. This idealized description may not accurately correspond to present reality; it rather prefigures what is hoped will be the form and spirit of the still unrealized future.

It follows from this that the main purpose of the governments of India and of the other still politically lethargic and backward countries should be to develop in their peoples those moral and intellectual qualities that will make self-government possible, so that ultimately, however near or far be the day, they may become autonomous in the same sense and to the same degree that Great Britain and Canada will be in the reorganized commonwealth. Whether this consummation be fully realizable—a question so doubtful as to preclude dogmatic certainty either way—matters less for the near future than the fact that this goal would absolutely determine the spirit of the government of the dependencies and permeate it with a concretely defined high purpose. As self-government is an art that can be acquired only by practice, this ideal demands, unless mere lip-service is paid to it, that the Dependent Empire should from the outset have some degree of representation in the central legislature of the commonwealth. This feature of the project is by far the most significant, for it discloses vistas of a new form of political organization.

If merely an organic union of the Dominions and Britain were to be formed and no provision were made for the representation of the peoples of the Dependent Empire, the new body politic, though differing in physical conformation and hence in extent of centralization from the United States, Germany, and Italy, would not be radically unlike them in character. However much stress is laid upon colonial nationalism, there are not sufficiently marked distinctions between Canadians and Englishmen to differentiate their union absolutely from that of Prussians and Bavarians. If limited in scope to the English-speaking peoples, the new federal state would be merely one of closely kindred nations ruling over large dependencies, not a world-commonwealth of distinct nations all united by the bond of common law. As a form of international organization, welding together many distinct peoples but allowing the fullest possible autonomy to the component parts, this proposed commonwealth presents, however, to the practical statesman many far-reaching possibilities of future world-organiza-

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tion such as formerly were only the substance of philosophers' and poets' dreams.

Idealists as well as realists in politics have hitherto been able to see no solution of the political problems arising out of the contact of the progressive and backward peoples of the world, other than the ultimate complete independence of those at present under political tutelage. Modern nationalism is, as has been well said, the joint product of two ideals, Renaissance sovereignty and Revolutionary rights. The former predicates in a general way the self-sufficiency of the state in a world of like units, each unhampered in pursuing its more or less self-regarding course by the force of law binding equally on all. The latter justifies each distinct segment of humanity in seeking such complete political independence and legal isolation from others of different speech or mind. But the existing world-anarchy has convincingly and disastrously demonstrated the moral and political bankruptcy of the current nationalist creed which looks upon the national state as the perfect type of political organization. From this standpoint national independence for the various peoples of the Dependent Empire is a reactionary ideal that does not meet the demands of a world whose unity is gradually becoming a political reality. If the world is to escape international anarchy in the future, some higher forms of political organization than the national state must be evolved. The British Empire is even to-day an example of such an international state, but its misleading nomenclature and outward form somewhat obscure its underlying significance, and its permanence is largely contingent upon the embodiment of its fundamental spirit in the organic union of the British Commonwealth. The project is one that cannot fail to appeal to all of progressive spirit. In its purpose there is no trace either of aggression towards other political aggregates nor of restraint upon whatever tendencies towards diversity of type there may be amongst the various peoples comprising it. But the road to be traversed before the goal is even in sight must appear rough and toilsome to all but the most intrepid. Lord Rosebery's recent words eloquently reflect its difficulties: "I cannot doubt that when the arduous efforts of the peace congress are over—an awful task, far surpassing a dozen confederates of Vienna—there will appear higher peaks behind mountain summits, there will appear the almost more gigantic task of reorganizing the British Empire."

GEORGE LOUIS BEER.

The World's Worst Failure

(IV) The Woman Without Fortitude

I FELL one night through the blackness of sleep into something different from a dream, and found myself hanging in some unknown moment of the past, like a lost swimmer treading water in a twilit sea. Then my brain began to record in visions that were bright yet very distant the story of a girl whose name and race I do not know, who lived, I cannot tell when, in some dead city that is now ploughed fields and quite forgets the time when it was the glory of an empire now the vast, unprofitable home of tribes too tired to fight.

The child sat on a silver cushion in the middle of the long cool room, whose very coolness was itself a luxury in this place of white molten skies, and with a rather dirty little golden hand traced in the air the pattern of the Persian hangings on the wall before her. Her little pink tongue stuck out abstractedly at the corner of her mouth, sometimes protruding still further to lick up traces of the many sweetmeats she had eaten, and she had the effect of being as solitary as she was absorbed. Yet on each side of her, all the way down to the curtained arches that terminated the room, there were women who were being women in a way that involved much agitation of the bosom and laughter that came out with sudden violence like the kick of a horse; and men who were being men in a way that involved an incessant lurching roar of joviality, and the shying of their vizorless helmets across the low table at the grinning old black slaves behind, so that oyster-shells and flasks of wine crashed into wet splinters on the marble floor beneath. It was true, however, that the child was solitary. For her childhood divided them from all her senses save her sight.

A jewelled brown hand held back the heavy curtain of the nearest archway, the curtain over which raised roses of velvet trailed lustrously. Its rubies caught her glance, and, cocking her little head down, she laughed at the bearded old Jew who stood behind the curtain watching the feast with bright eyes that ran hither and thither like rats, yet came back to smile on the child.

The old hand dropped from the curtain, and the child's gaze wandered. But when the curtain fell back and showed new people entering, she was child enough to gape at them, although she had long ago learned that here new people remained

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new no longer than the first glinting of their armor in that doorway, but turned at once into just such strutting males as he to whom the Jew was now so deeply bowing. Yet as he pushed past into the banquet-hall and brought his beard down to the plump neck of the golden-haired Jewess from the Levant, and the old pander bowed again to the second newcomer, her eyes changed to the honest stare of an interested child.

A freckled boy stood there, averting a clear young face from the Jew's obeisance as though he felt baseness an affront to the clean young world in which he lived even when it bowed. He stood scowling over the Jew's bent back, his head tremulous with fierce modesty, his hand playing with the scarlet cloak that, hanging from his right shoulder with an air, set the brave note of his straight slight body. Plainly he was near to weeping because the man who had brought him had left him so nakedly alone, but he was seeing the thing through, in a gruff and uncommon manly voice. Always before it had been the child's happiness that in this house she was allowed to dream apart, required to do no more than play the flute behind hangings and carry wine in goblets to the great. But now she longed, so ardently that tears of disappointment gathered in her eyes, that he should come and sit by her. For never before had she seen the helmet and breastplate worn by one so near her own age.

There was a clanking by her side and the quick breathing of a man settling himself in comfort, and her heart leapt up in her. "My lord will drink?" she whispered, very hoarse with shyness, to the uninspected presence. He shook his head. "My lord will eat?" she quavered. He shook his head again, and there was silence. "But," she blurted out, "there are peaches cooled in snow!" His brown gaze became perceptibly wistful, but he shook himself in a passion of high virility. "No! I don't care for that sort of thing!" The Jew spied on them from the crimson curtain, and she felt that for fear of losing his favor she must show that she had listened diligently to the lessons that had so often been read to her from the Book of the Seven and Seventy Delights of Love. So she raised her little hand, grubby with drawing patterns on the dust, to caress his face. But something on his cheekbone arrested her gesture. "What's that?" she breathed. He jerked it out with head held high. "That's where a ferret got me. It hung on and we couldn't get it to let go. One of our swineherds keeps ferrets. This was one of his. It hurt dreadfully but I didn't mind. But how the women screamed!" He laughed scornfully but not unkindly while she murmured, "Oh, you must be very brave!" and they were once more enclosed by a confused throbbing silence.

Darkly withdrawn from them was the Jew, although his eyes were on them, veiled in the infinite remoteness of his great age and his secret race. "Take thy young lord into the garden," he said, and put into the boy's hands a pretty carven box of sweetmeats. The scarlet cloak swaggered, and there was gold flung down magnificently on the shining chest. The Jew gathered it to his bosom with crooked fingers that were all greed and raised a face that was all tenderness. "May my young lord buy no baser pleasure!"

Never since the beginning of the world was there an afternoon long enough for a child to show its garden to another child. There were the orange-groves, now burnished harshly by the summer and lit only here and there by a golden globe forgotten by the pluckers, and there were the clay hives where the honey-bees made their music. There was the marble tank of water, seething with sunshine and strewn with scarlet petals, and overhung by a tree laden with little green fruits of three stones, which the boy crunched between his teeth as minute by minute he grew a kinder friend. There were the fountains which played tricks and suddenly, as one put one's foot on the stone flagging to come nearer to their plashing, sent their cold columns down one's body. There were the marble balustrades over which they hung and watched bronze-limbed boys diving from the roof of the mill below into the broad tawny river, while the boy envied them and told her what prodigious distances he could swim in those blue lakes to which the purple heather of his own hills fell. The boy looked up at the mountains and talked sternly of the enemy that lay encamped in those grim fastnesses. The child shifted her sweetmeat to the other cheek and pondered; so rarely was the war mentioned in this house of pleasure that she had half forgotten they dwelt in a beleaguered city.

"If the enemy came, must you fight?" she asked. "Yes!" he cried sturdily. "I must be brave. It is my work. Perhaps I shall die a general much honored by the people. On his deathbed, while the women wept, my father took my hand and said, 'My son, be brave!' I have always remembered it. Indeed it is the man's part to be brave and protect his women." And he put a stiff little arm round her waist and led her back to the tank, where they sat and ate more of the little green fruit with three stones, and dipped their hands in the waters and suddenly found them icy with evening. And the sky dripped green light, and a thousand stars opened their eyes, and the night fell. They spoke and played no more, but sat looking down on the image of their faces in the starlit waters, tears filling their eyes and tenderness breaking their hearts. And, when it was quite dark, they kissed.

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They trembled to each other and the cold seemed unkind, so they walked up the garden into the deserted court where the fountain played. Such solitude was enough for them, and they paid no heed to the hum of riot from the banquet hall, the soaring of flutes and the screech of laughter, but looked through the darkness into each other's eyes. Not one thought had she of the Book of the Seven and Seventy Delights of Love. Her little mind was pressed to his, drawing out the deliciousness of his backgrounds. "There is a stone terrace before my house, flanked with pines, which looks to the west, over the plains, over the sea, to this very place. Every sunset my mother and my sister go out and stand there, turning their faces towards me." She said, "I have no one to think of me," and he clasped her to him. "Wherever I am, my heart will always turn to you!" Her gaze strained at him doubtfully and in reassurance his young voice steadied to solemnity. "Always and always, if I live a hundred years!" And after that sleep fell like a curtain between them and their play, and yawning and rubbing their eyes they went up the staircase to seek a resting-place. On a broad couch in a far room they curled up, warm and relaxed and confident, like sleeping animals.

Broad daylight flashed and she sat up, her body beating with the sense of danger. Spears of sunshine were thrust through the high window and with their goldenness there came shrieks and the clanging of metal. She leaped up and clung by her hands to the ledge, drawing herself up till she could look down on the corner of the market-place. The booths were falling like a house of cards, fine stuffs weltering in the dust, and all the men rushed backwards like ebbing surf; and upward through the confusion there were raised lances that glittered, lances that dipped and came up red. She went back to the boy and shook him. "The enemy have come!" she quavered; for it meant, she remembered, that he would have to fight. When he heard her words he lay quite still for a minute before he rose and sprang to the window. He stiffened as he looked, and took up his sword and helmet like a priest assuming his vestments. They ran through corridors and alcoves and passed on their way the Jew, who had taken some tiles out of the wall and was packing bags of gold and preciousness into the hollow space within. He wailed, "Be good children and you will be safe." They fled on in their bright path. The boy lifted a wine-stained scabbard from the floor, now filthied from the feast, and in silence that meant trust gave her the sword.

The court below was full of strange ruddy men in brassy armor, with fleshy lips lifting over large teeth, who seemed to be moving about in a flushed and aimless delirium and discussing where they should go next. The boy lifted his sword and sent out a war-cry that winged above them like a bird. A man turned and casually transfixed him with a spear and looked lightly away again. The boy's body rolled down six steps and stopped. It was the most terrible thing that ever happened, and what made it worse was that there was a feeling as if nothing had happened at all. The child looked down on his dark head, still damp and ruffled with sleep, and then on his ruddy slayer, whose movements had at the sight of her become purposeful and who was now scaling the stairs, and she knew that it was her duty to raise the sword that dangled so heavy from her wrist and press its point into her breast. But fortitude must enclose grace like a crystal sphere or it goes out, blown by the winds that gird the earth unceasingly, and she had none of it. There was nothing about fortitude in the Book of the Seven and Seventy Delights of Love. So her sword dropped—it fell cruelly, hitting the dead boy's head, so that she wept—and she cowered back before the first of the unnumbered infamies which, all her life long, were to tread down the white flower of her early loveliness deeper into the mud.

So spoke her dishonored dust, lost in the ploughed fields of a fallen empire. Elegance, it cried, will let a woman neither live nor die; and it wailed for the power, that should have been its birthright, to make those sharp decisions which bring humanity to its last and safest harbor of a noble death.

REBECCA WEST.

CORRESPONDENCE

From Mr. Gompers

SIR: Some time ago Miss Ellen Gates Starr, Hull House, Chicago, sent me a copy of the article entitled "Cheap Clothes and Nasty," which you published in the January 1st, 1916 issue of THE NEW REPUBLIC. She wrote me in regard to the recent strike of the garment workers in Chicago, quoting and endorsing some of the statements made in the article to which I have referred. I enclose a copy of my letter to her in reply, and ask that in justiec to the American Federation of Labor, and to me as its chosen representative, you publish my reply as soon as you possibly can in your magazine.

SAMUEL GOMPERS,
President American Federation of Labor.

Washington, D. C., Jan. 28, 1916.

Miss Ellen Gates Starr,
Hull House, Chicago, Illinois.

Dear Madam:

Your letter of January 8th was received in due time, but there have been such pressing and constant demands upon my time and attention that I could not reply to you sooner.

It was indeed a surprise that one with your long and varied experience at Hull House and intimacy with the

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lives of the toilers who live around South Halstead Street, Chicago, should have so little real understanding of that comprehensive force in the lives of the workers—the trade union movement.

However, I can understand your keen sympathy with the suffering and the hunger and the struggle of the garment workers in their recent strike. Undoubtedly it was that emotional sympathy that made you condemn so severely the trade union movement and me. The abuse and the injustice that have been inflicted upon these garment workers of Chicago aroused me to protest against the unwarranted abuse, brutality and violence of the police of Chicago. Those who are in the labor movement, who have made the labor movement what it is by their sacrifices and their struggles, understand that its power and effectiveness depend upon solidarity and united action; yet the labor movement is a voluntary association. It is subject to all the shortcomings of democracy. Its progress and its continued existence depend upon the wisdom and understanding of its members. Years of experience have taught them their common interest, and that they must stand together and fight out their differences within the organization.

Secession or any other disruptionary movement is fatal to the very existence of the labor movement. Secession means to the labor movement just what the secession of the Southern states in 1860 meant to the union. It is the act of those who are willing to destroy the whole and jeopardize the welfare of all others in order that they may secure their own objects. Whatever the purpose of seceders may be, their act is that of those who are unwilling to present their demands and to abide by the decision of the majority. Secession is fatal to democratic organization. If the cause of the seceders is just, they ought to be willing to contend for their demands under the laws and regulations of their voluntary organizations, and thus seek to establish justice without jeopardizing the welfare of themselves or their fellow-workers. But since the labor movement is a democratic organization, there is no authority or force that can compel them to remain within it. When they choose to secede they incur all of the dangers and all of the consequences that attend a secession movement. This is what the garment workers of Chicago brought upon themselves when they left the United Garment Workers. Although we may regret their act and deplore the fact that they have been victimized, yet we cannot protect them from the consequences of their own acts; for to endorse and approve a secession movement would be to establish a standard that would endanger the existence of a united labor movement which would jeopardize the welfare not only of the organized workers but of the unorganized, who benefit in some degree by the struggle and the success of the organized labor movement.

Since the progress and the very existence of the labor movement depend upon united action, there is no more insidious danger that can threaten the movement than contention within and secession movements. There are innumerable enemies of the organized labor movement and oppressors of wage-earners who seek to disrupt the labor movement and to get the wage-earners within their power. If we do not unite solidly against the foes without, the cause of human welfare and freedom will suffer.

What the toilers need to learn and to have grounded deep into their consciousness is the advice that Spartacus gave to his fellow-slaves whom he was leading in an effort to secure some rights from a despotic Roman government. His words to them were, "If you must fight, fight your masters."

The fight of the wage-earners of America against their employers to establish better conditions of life and work is so tremendous that they ought not to waste a moment of time or a bit of their energy or resources in fighting each other. Is there no lesson for the wage-earners in that oft-repeated axiom, "Divided we cannot stand"? This declaration applies to the labor movement as well as to every other kind of human activity. Friction within and secession movements defeat the purposes of the movement.

Undoubtedly it was because you did not understand the fundamental principles of the trade union movement that you were so severe in your condemnation. It was not "the heavy hand of Mr. Gompers" that shut off sources of aid from the striking garment workers of Chicago, but it was their own voluntary act in dissociating themselves from the labor movement, as well as the necessity and the duty of those who are in the labor movement to defend its existence from menace and attack both from without and within. The labor movement is a struggle against industrial and social wrongs and injustice. It must maintain organization and discipline, although of a voluntary nature, if it is to secure its purposes and secure better and greater opportunities for an increasing number of wage-earners.

Yours very truly,

SAMUEL GOMPERS,
President American Federation of Labor.

Mr. Belloc Remains Sure

SIR: The letter signed "An American" in your issue of January 15th calls for a reply. Whether it would be an error to take my writing as "influential" in this country, as your correspondent denies, I must leave it to others to determine; but the point at issue, and the matter in your correspondent's mind when he wrote, is really this: whether the view I expressed in my communication to your paper as being that of this country is representative or no.

I said that no greater error could be made by the educated opinion of the most powerful neutral nation, the United States, than to misunderstand the attitude of the Allies, particularly of Great Britain, in the matter of this war. I said that misunderstandings of this sort were exceedingly common in distant neutral communities, as the European (and particularly the British) attitude proved during the Civil War in America. I then went on to say what the attitude of the Allies, and of the British in particular, was in this respect: to wit, that their effort was directed to the rendering impotent of Germany under Prussia to do evil in the future, and that this can only be effected by a complete success in arms. If your correspondent likes to use the word "crush" to describe this process, I shall be happy to use that loose metaphor, and to repeat that the effort of the British with their Allies is directed to the "crushing" of Germany, in the same sense in which any thoroughly victorious Power throughout the course of history has "crushed" some other Power which it had as thoroughly defeated.

Your correspondent says that if you ask any "thinking, influential man" in England whether that is the aim of the British at this moment, he would reply, "Certainly not," and that he would found this reply (unique I think in all history from the citizen of a nation fighting for its life) upon two very strange reasons. First, that it is impossible to achieve a thorough victory, and secondly, that commercially Great Britain cannot afford such a victory.

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Now I am not concerned to debate at any length, for the moment, whether the aim of this country and its Allies is right or wrong, feasible or not feasible; but the question whether my statement was accurate or whether that of your correspondent, "An American," was accurate, can be put to a very simple test.

Let this plain question be asked: whether a complete victory rendering Germany impotent for that aggressive war which under Prussia she has preached, desired and at last acted, whether the breaking of her power, her complete and utter defeat until she lies at our mercy, be not the aim of the overwhelming mass of Englishmen and of their Allies at this moment?

Let this plain question be asked of any list of representative Englishmen you choose. Take half a dozen of the professional politicians, take half a dozen writers prominent in English literature to-day, and not suffering, as I do, from an alien religion and from a proportion of alien (Irish and French) blood. Take such men as Mr. Frederick Harrison, Mr. Chesterton, Mr. Kipling, or any other out of the somewhat restricted list that you may choose. Ask the same question even of our divines. Ask the same question of our principal academic authorities; and see what answer you will receive.

H. BELLOC.

Kings Land, Shipley, Horsham,
England.

England Not for Pan-America

SIR: In his "Washington Notes" W. L. writes: "Our guarantees for Pan-America are either meaningless or supreme folly unless we know where England stands in regard to them."

Since England in 1822 was anxious to withstand all Europe under the Holy Alliance for the sake of a paltry three millions of South American trade, is it conceivable that she will remain passive while a Pan-American alliance is being formed with a purpose of securing American control of South America's present billion and a half commerce? Certainly we can see where England is likely to stand.

R. R. CROSS.

Doylestown, Ohio.

Would Tax Land Values

SIR: Your article in THE NEW REPUBLIC of January 22nd, entitled "The Nemesis of Reform," attracted my attention, containing as it does so much truth. In nothing is this more in evidence than in the sentence, "Reform has shirked the duty of thinking its problems through."

In a certain New England city some years ago a wealthy lady gave a large sum of money to establish a free city library and city water supply. The immediate effect was that the price of land went up, soon doubling. Well, in consequence of these improvements the city became a better place to live in, and why shouldn't the owners of the land charge people more for the privilege of living there? Under our present system it is impossible for the public to really receive a gift of any kind; eventually its money value goes to the owners of the land. Cases might be multiplied; the writer of the article names several. The cure for this condition is so evident that we must suppose the writer had it in mind when he wrote the article. It is, to levy the taxes on land values—values created by the public—and remove them from improvements and personal property. These last represent values created by individuals. "Thinking the problem through" will inevitably lead to this conclusion.

CHARLES E. BENTON.

Rochester, New York.

What Causes Aesthetic Feeling

SIR: The article on Cezanne by Mr. Leo D. Stein in your issue of January 22nd is sound and illuminating. It is unfortunate, however, that Mr. Stein should have based his introduction upon questionable psychological principles. I refer to his explanation of the genesis of aesthetic feeling as "a product of frustrated action." The result of a frustrated act is displeasure, the very opposite of what one experiences in the presence of a satisfying work of art; Mr. Stein's explanation seems therefore to constitute a paradox. Introspection would never confirm the implied assertion that in aesthetic experience a person is kept from doing what he wishes, nor will it reveal any conflict of wishes. That view would suggest an application of the Freudian principles of conflict and repression beyond their proper sphere.

In its general form the problem is that of the objectification of pleasure, and one searches in vain through such representative works as those of Santayana and Vernon Lee for its explanation in the terms of any single factor; indeed, the possibility of such an explanation is denied by Bosanquet, in his most recent "Lectures on Aesthetics."

Broadly considered, aesthetic pleasure is the substitute for the crude pleasures of instinctive response, and the history of their substitution is the replacement of the practical attitude by the aesthetic. Tragedy regarded as a reality is not pleasant, but it is possible to assume toward the tragic episode an attitude of detachment which may make it an object of pleasure. This changed attitude need not result from a frustration of practical impulses. In highly endowed individuals it may be congenital, and its acquisition by persons less endowed would be inaccurately described as a process of frustration.

The key to the problem of aesthetic experience is probably to be found in the conception of sublimation, in the accurate Freudian sense. The psychology of sublimation has yet to be written, but the beginning has been made by Freud and his disciples, and the results thus far are more than promising. Frustration may play a small part, may even pave the way for it in some instances, but certainly cannot exhaust the full process.

ALBERT C. BARNES.

Overbrook, Pennsylvania.

First Free the Press

SIR: Governor Hunt's exposé (to which the article "A Strike Without Disorder" refers in your issue of January 22nd) of the bribes which mine owners gave to local newspapers in Greenlee county, Arizona, in return for printing plate matter favorable to them during a strike, shows the helpless nature of public opinion in its present dependence on private journalism.

To adequately express itself public opinion must use newspapers. But at present these are invariably sup-

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ported privately. Their resources are limited to those of their owners, and under the present closely organized system of credit, a few financiers control them. Consequently when an issue between the public and private interests arises, the newspaper is forced to look to its fountain head. Public opinion cannot be enlightened and cannot act through a puny press. As long as publishers must live by the grace of wealthy men, society cannot be sure of having its interests protected.

In the difficult work of setting human freedom above the privilege of wealth, a collectively owned press is indispensable. If constructive thought were to attack the problem of cat's-paw journalism, machinery might be devised which would make succeeding social reform less precarious and halting.

RAYMOND CLAPPER.

Lawrence, Kansas.

Is It?

SIR: Kindness is the lifeblood of my existence. I am pained, grievously pained, to think ill of anyone or anything. For many years, in the more nebulous period of my career, so greatly did I fear to think unfavorably of anyone or anything that I assiduously avoided having thoughts of anyone or anything. But college amputated my fear of thought, at the same time leaving intact my kindness. While in college I could not but observe that kindness is not particular to me, but is common to all mankind. And that you, being kind as I am, may with me avoid thinking ill of anyone or anything, I freely divulge what I have lately discovered.

In brief: if a lawyer says something, a college professor in metaphysics says something, a minister (Episcopalian preferred) says something, the literary editor of the *Mother's Home Companion* says something, or anyone else of a sombre, serious, responsible station in American life says something you do not quite grasp; in other words, if some slight phase of some idea spoken has a tendency to cause you irritation and you ask yourself, "Why did he (or she) say that?" with a growing subconscious feeling that you would have to think ill of the worthy gentleman for saying something neither clever, nor thoughtful, nor entertaining, but simply useless: or, in brief, if you have recently masticated to the best of your ability some article in the *Philosophical Review* for the month of December, pored over some article in the *Theological Quarterly* which visits your parlor center table four times yearly, read a book just out, of which the magazines have been publishing serious, earnest reviews and of which the newspapers have all, even to village weeklies, made mention editorially: if, in brief, you have done some such reading and find yourself afraid that you might be forced to think ill of the writer and the thing read, it appearing to you to be more than quite without merit; then, impatient reader, that you may manifest your kindness, rise in the company of those who have read or heard the disturbing verbs, nouns, pronouns, adjectives, conjunctions, etc., seemingly heaped together in a profitless way, and rising, propound in a loud, pomptious voice the kindness-nursing, conscience-saving suggestion, "Perhaps it is satire."

I recently read a book; a long book whose pages were more than a hundred times the sacred number seven; a book bound in a cover the color of the hospital cross; a book which harbored characters really inconsistent—not inconsistent in the ordinary way but inconsistent in a most paradoxical, unbelievable way; a book which catalogues knowledge in various apartments and propounds lists of deep subjects for discussion, all of which read much the same as the titles of books in any departmental book store or in any public library's "Reader's Guide"; a book which has its characters talk not in the usual charming progressive way, but in the endless, senseless American banter of pretty chickens termed "kidding"; a book calling forth the question, "I wonder now, if life can really be such?"—not having that absorbing force which makes one gasp "How true to life!"; a book which seems to say that any sacredness is a joke to those spiritually gifted; a book which advances the doubtful doctrine that to the truly endowed, art is but "the idle pastime of a lazy summer day"; a book with no particular force to redeem it for its unshapeliness, its lack of technique, a deficiency never warranted where novel-structure is found wanting; a book which bears the interesting phenomenon of quotation marks in its title—quotation marks which have lead me, kindhearted as I have said I am, to wonder and to say to you once more, knowing you to be kindhearted also, that perhaps "The Genius," by Mr. Theodore Dreiser, is a satire.

CLAUDE HABBERSTAD.

Beloit, Wisconsin.

Bad for Both

SIR: In THE NEW REPUBLIC of January 29th Mr. Wharton Clay makes a plea for the introduction of military training in our colleges. A boyhood divided between an army post and one of the best of our private military schools, and later years spent as a university instructor have given the writer a keen interest in both army and college, and he would like to urge the consideration, though neither new nor original, which leads him to regard any attempt to combine military training with higher education as highly ill-advised.

Both army and colleges suffer sufficiently already from our national habit of trying to make one tool serve several wholly incompatible ends. Of the army we demand canal-building, river and harbor improvement, colonial administration, police duty in the stead of a constabulary, rescue work in times of calamity, and almost every service for which no other agency is provided in our ill-organized civil government. In such spare moments as may be left it, we doubtless expect this body of men to acquire the proficiency which other armies attain only by devoting all their time and energies to the study of military science and the practice of the arts of war.

Of our colleges we require that they perform functions which, in the most advanced countries of Europe, are divided among institutions of three distinct types, the higher schools (Lycées, Gymnasien), the technical institutes, and the universities. As if this were not enough, we encourage the students to devote a large part of their attention to "outside activities" of a dozen different kinds, and see to it that the instructors have as little inducement as possible to persist in scholarship and teaching, but every temptation to turn to merely clerical or administrative work. Having thus dulled and damaged by misuse two of the most highly specialized and delicate tools in the national kit, shall we now seek to combine them into a new-fangled instrument which shall be at the same time the best possible hammer, chisel and saw?

COLLEGIAN.

Princeton, New Jersey.

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Books and Things

IT is impossible to read the correspondence between President Wilson and Mr. Garrison without making guesses. All we can be sure of is that in this quarrel, as in all other quarrels, neither party sees himself as the other sees him. On this occasion, as on most occasions when President Wilson and somebody else have ceased to be friends, this difference of opinion is probably very great. Mr. Wilson, so far as we outsiders know him, does not easily conceive himself as acting upon any motives that are less than seven feet high. It would be painful to him to admit that his motives at any particular time were less high than they had been at some other time. Now I should not think of affirming that Mr. Wilson was alone in believing that he is always actuated by motives of exceptional and uniform height. Mr. William Bayard Hale seems at one time to have held this belief about Mr. Wilson, and may hold it still, for all I know. So, I imagine, does Mr. Tumulty. None the less is it true that one of the easiest ways of being misunderstood, of turning disagreements in opinion into another kind of disagreement, is to contract the habit of attributing to oneself the highest of high motives. Mr. Wilson's passion for tall motives is as intense and sincere as Friedrich Wilhelm's passion for tall men in his Potsdam regiment.

In the present instance, where every attempt to see Mr. Wilson through Mr. Wilson's eyes must be guesswork, the way to play safe is choose from among the by-standing high motives that one which explains most of the facts. Mr. Wilson is a recent convert to a belief in the necessity of more preparedness. Soon after the war started he saw with disfavor the spread of this belief, and the conclusion he came to was that the Augustus Peabody Gardners and other believing legislators had better be squelched. Neither the date nor the process of Mr. Wilson's own conversion is known. A description of the process, step by step, would have been interesting and might have been persuasive, but in none of the speeches made on his recent journey did Mr. Wilson choose to describe it. All he told us was that he had learned lessons since the war started, that he was a convert, and that the following was one of the articles in his new creed: "I want the Congress of the United States to do a great deal for the National Guard, but I do not see how the Congress of the United States can put the National Guard at the disposal of the nation; therefore, it seems absolutely necessary that in addition to the National Guard there should be a considerable body of men of some military training who are willing to pledge themselves to come at the call of the nation." This is from the President's Milwaukee speech delivered January 31st. Less than a fortnight later we find the President (a) unwilling to have Mr. Garrison put forward something very like this opinion as if it were still the administration's opinion, and (b) quite willing to talk things over with men whose opinion was opposed to what his own had been on January 31st. When I search for the high motive which explains these facts I find nothing better than this: Mr. Wilson's desire to be that rarest of rare animals, the wholly reasonable and unexacting and undogmatic and unbigoted recent convert. The height of this motive is not more remarkable than its irrelevance. Seldom has a President with a will as strong as Mr. Wilson's had such a sudden attack of sweet reasonableness. The suddenness of his conversion to a belief in the necessity of more preparedness is as nothing when compared to the suddenness of his conversion to a belief in the necessity for openness of mind.

In imagination, still guessing and messing about, I offer this explanation to Mr. Garrison, and in imagination I see him reject it. Even if he accepted it he might argue that it represented President Wilson as caring a good deal more about his reputation for openness of mind, for reasonableness and willingness to oblige, than he cared about getting a continental army out of Congress. Even if Mr. Garrison accepted it he might ask why Mr. Wilson had chosen preparedness as the fitting occasion for such a display of open-mindedness as President Wilson had earlier in his term more than once refused to make. Why, Mr. Garrison might ask, does Mr. Wilson now refuse, when preparedness is at stake, to exert as much pressure upon Congress as he had no hesitation in exerting when the things at stake were our tariff and banking laws? "I understood," Mr. Garrison might say, "when President Wilson at last wrote O. K. on those army plans he never discussed with me in private, that his conversion was complete enough to have heated him up to the fighting point. I find he was heated only up to the speechmaking point. My explanation of the President's sudden sweet reasonableness is that it wasn't quite so sudden as you seem to think, that he cared a good deal less about the continental army plan than I supposed—than I had good reason for supposing—that he cared. I have known Mr. Wilson as a last-ditch fighter in every cause he deems good. When I see such a man paralyzed by a fit of reasonableness, willing to parley with the enemy, behaving all at once like a man ready to make concessions on vital points, how am I to escape the conclusion that he never at heart believed in the goodness of this particular cause?" To Mr. Garrison, you see, I unwarrantably and impertinently ascribe a belief that there may be two explanations of a recent convert's freedom from bigotry. First, he may be free from bigotry. Second, he may never have been a convert.

All of which has no bearing on the merits of the controversy between Mr. Garrison and the President. I have only been trying to illustrate, by guessing behind the record, the ease with which a man like Mr. Wilson, who always acts consciously upon high motives, and whose understanding of himself I accept as correct, may be misunderstood by those who see much of him. This is especially easy when he chooses, as the occasion for making a return upon himself, for adding a new trait to his character and a new virtue to his collection, a cause which the misunderstander has very much at heart. At such a time the misunderstander is likely to think that the more important has been sacrificed to the less.

So easy and natural are these misunderstandings that I for one do not accuse Mr. Garrison of wilful blindness to Mr. Wilson's motives. I accuse him only of that kind of blindness which often afflicts men whose eyes are over-exposed to motives of dazzling purity. And blinded though he may be, Mr. Garrison's conduct, except at the very last, has so far as we know given Mr. Wilson no just ground for complaint. Until the very last Mr. Garrison's behavior seems to have been spotless. Only since his resignation has he erred, and then mainly by omission. Had he been a more imaginative man, with a deeper insight into the spiritual needs of his former chief, he would have indulged himself in a front page of pique, huffiness, resentment and garrulous grudge. He would have borne himself with less dignity, would have given the public reason to revise its opinion that the country has lost something by his resignation.

P. L.

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A Liberal Distraught

The Crimes of England, by G. K. Chesterton. New York: John Lane Co. $1.00 net.

NOTHING is so disarming as sincerity. In this book by Gilbert Chesterton there is so deep a sincerity that it almost puts criticism out of court. If he made one angry, it would be easy to combat him. But he is too greatly moved himself not to move his reader. His grip on his convictions is so strong as almost to seem a grip on reality. It is only by remembering how ardent conviction does so often pervert reality that one is able to hold his argument at arm's length.

It is a commonplace of medical practice that a man must keep his desires separate from his judgment. In most diagnoses there are alternatives, some more benign than others, and a man who desires intensely to choose the benign alternative cannot be trusted to pursue any diagnosis to the inexorable end. A member of the medical profession does not dare rely on his keenness in treating his own family. Whether he tends to magnify or minimize, he is not trustworthy. He is not disinterested enough to evalue the facts. The more serious the predicament, the more suspicious he is of his judgment. He calls in a "stranger," a cool outsider, to diagnose and prescribe. The present war of nations Mr. Chesterton would hardly admit to be pathologic. He would hardly deem himself a partisan too concerned to think straight. But his book is really at the far extreme of concerned perversion. It only seems to be open-minded because it regards the argument as closed.

It is not that Mr. Chesterton is blind to the crimes of England. Those crimes, the crimes against democracy, he arraigns with a powerful voice. "I have passed the great part of my life," he says, "in criticizing and condemning the existing rulers and institutions of my country: I think it is infinitely the most patriotic thing that a man can do. I have no illusions either about our past or our present. I think our whole history in Ireland has been a vulgar and ignorant hatred of the crucifix, expressed by a crucifixion. I think the South African War was a dirty work which we did under the whips of money-lenders. I think Mitchelstown was a disgrace; I think Denshawi was a devilry." The shame of England, and it is smeared with shame, Mr. Chesterton accepts like a man. But I conceive that he is terribly wrong in identifying all that shame, or even a great part of it, with the game of Prussia in Europe. And that is the task to which his ingenious and lively imagination is applied.

How lively and how ingenious his indictment the reader may judge from his bitter summing-up. "We were very wrong indeed," he proclaims, "when we took part in preventing Europe from putting a term to the impious piracies of Frederick the Great. We were very wrong indeed when we allowed the triumph over Napoleon to be soiled with the mire and blood of Blücher's sullen savages. We were very wrong indeed when we allowed the peaceful King of Denmark to be robbed in broad daylight by a brigand named Bismarck; and when we allowed the Prussian swashbucklers to enslave and silence the English provinces which they could never govern nor persuade. We were very wrong indeed when we flung to such hungry adventurers a position so important as Heligoland. We were very wrong indeed when we praised the soulless Prussian education and copied the soulless Prussian laws."

The greatest criticism of these charges, for all their strong and brilliant reinforcement, is their success in proving too much. One is not necessarily pro-falsehood because one happens to be pro-Ally, and it is a gigantic falsehood to adjust the perspective of history to suit a particular crisis. It is not for nothing that Mr. Chesterton has written detective stories. The definiteness with which he can affirm does not depend solely on his skill in interpretation. It depends largely on his skill in devising a hypothesis to interpret, and his main characteristics require him to find an exciting plot in which good is pitted against evil. He is never satisfied that a subject is a subject unless he has framed it as a concrete mystery to explain. Part of this comes from his pure love of a game. He delights in working out his hypothesis as a Chinaman delights in working out a puzzle. But that is not his supreme delight, which is in the moral. He is under necessity to divide men into heroes and scoundrels, to interpret all life as a glorious and free exercise in choice. But unlike the dull sceptic, who seeks to adduce principles from phenomena faithfully observed, Mr. Chesterton starts with his principles and is only at pains to procure the suitable phenomena. Thus everything he writes has relish both as a pastime and a lesson on life.

It was the French, one recalls, who were England's hereditary enemies—the godless French. One may well conceive how that godlessness would have protruded at Mr. Chesterton if a different set of alliances were in order. But how does he take the French now? There is no word about the persecuted church or race suicide. He refers lightly to "two centuries of the belittlement of France." He deprecates "the rather fruitless glories of Agincourt and Malplaquet." He loftily dismisses the "pedantries" of the last generation, "which already talked of Latin inferiority." He forgets how most liberal Englishmen rejoiced with Germany in 1871. He prefers to devise a eulogy of Napoleon III.

History is not accidental. Races and mythologies are causal, to some extent, as well as governance and trade, rulers and realms. But no outside influence, however convenient, can be the whole explanation of the crimes of England, any more than a draught can be the whole explanation of a cold. The ruling caste in Germany may have had evil interrelation with the ruling caste in England. He makes it clear that it did. But to blame all English rottenness on Germany is like blaming the failure of the crops on the Democrats. And to substitute German devilry for Latin inferiority is only to exchange one pedantry for another—a useful pedantry at the moment, but a shallow one.

If you have an umbrella with you on the right occasion it is a godsend. If you are without it you are ruined. But the thing that shields you in foul weather may shackle you in fair. To be burdened with it out of season is a bore and a humiliation. A theory of race invented to agree with urgent necessities is a little like an omnipresent umbrella. It assumes too much stability in bad weather. About thirty years ago a quite able Englishman set himself to explain America. Preaching the everlasting ties of blood, he assured America it was Teutonic. "To me the past history and present condition of the United States is, before all things, a part of the general history of the Teutonic race, and specially of its English branch." And what he meant by Teutonic he amplified. "The German, and still more the Scandinavian, settlers are simply men of our own race who have lagged behind in the western march, but who have at last made it at a single pull, without tarrying for a thousand years in the isle of Britain."

This preacher of "the everlasting ties of blood" was

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the Oxford historian, Edward A. Freeman. His message of Teutonism was specially enjoyed in Boston. There he tickled the natives by giving Teutonism a pleasant politic twist. "Men better versed in American matters than myself point out to me the fact that the negro vote balances the Irish vote. But one may be allowed to think that an Aryan land might do better still without any negro vote, that a Teutonic land might do better still without any Irish vote." If Boston could have eliminated the Irish vote on the basis of its everlasting Teutonic blood, nothing would have pleased it better then.

Blücher's "sullen savages" were not mentioned by Mr. Freeman. Nor Frederick's "blind and narrow savage" of a father. Nor Luther's anarchy. Nor Frederick's "mysterious vileness." Nor the foulness of the German mercenaries in the eighteenth century. Nor Teutonic imperialism and materialism and slavery. These, in 1882, were not mentioned as ingredients in the "everlasting ties of blood."

What does Mr. Chesterton mean by democracy if he so stigmatizes a race, especially a race benighted in "slavery"? No Englishman to my knowledge has ever done such justice to the Irish people as Mr. Chesterton does in this volume. Ignorance and vulgarity, as he implies, have been the common traits of Englishmen in relation to Ireland. Without ignorance, without vulgarity, with candor, with magnanimity, he faces England's crime against Ireland. He is the one Englishman, to my knowledge, who has learned that before crimes against Ireland nobly admitted Irish reproach must hold its peace. But that same greatness of heart is due to the German people. Without it there can be no democracy. There is nothing he says about the German infamy that great Englishmen have not believed about the Irish infamy. And neither infamy is so. It is no crime of England's that she is fighting Germany. If the Allies smash the iron ring that German rulers have girdled around the German people, it is well, even if they must smash Germans to do so. But no ring will be smashed if there is raving against "sullen savages." By such devil's fire are new rings welded.

F. H.

To Free the Seas

The World's Highway, by Norman Angell. New York: George H. Doran Co. $1.50 net.

UNDER this striking title Mr. Norman Angell has grouped together a number of his recent contributions to various periodicals; he has subjected them to some revision and has made extensive additions. While a distinct thread of unifying conception runs through the book, it is a slender one, and ill bears the weight of controversial material Mr. Angell has hung upon it. While eminently readable the volume lacks substantial unity and coherence.

The motive of this present book is found in the very evident need of the United States for some effective method of securing recognition of her rights on the sea, and some protection for her citizens against the encroachments of England and Germany. Mr. Angell shows the need of something more than a mere temporary arrangement, and the extreme difficulty of securing a permanent solution by any of the older methods. The ineffectiveness of diplomatic notes is apparent. The failure of prize courts to interpret international law in a manner satisfactory to the United States he describes clearly. Neutrality he regards as a fiction; no progress has been made in the last half century in the protection of neutral rights, and the present form of neutrality he believes must be abolished if the substance of neutral rights is to be attained. He claims that "the belligerent cannot respect the sovereignty and independence of the neutral, the neutral cannot observe real impartiality." Military preparedness he does not believe necessary for the United States, and, as in his other books, he declares war futile as a method of obtaining results. Any inevitable clash of economic interests sufficient to require the use of force he scouts as impossible.

The true method of international coercion should be economic pressure exerted by a group of nations against the offender or offenders. This should be made effective by the use of the sea power, which he finds not dangerous to democracy as is militarism, but a useful and necessary part of international machinery. Its internationalization, however, would be necessary. "America would offer to settle the contraband and blockade dispute with England on the basis of making international that virtual control of the overseas trade of the world which England now exercises; . . . but that control should be exercised, not arbitrarily by Great Britain, but by all the Allies plus the United States with the unofficial coöperation of the remaining neutrals as well" (p. 18). The writer explains (pp. 155-158) that this project "does not involve the limitation of belligerent right at sea as against neutral right. It amounts indeed to a proposal to increase belligerent power by the voluntary transfer from the neutral of his existing rights in return for a more effective defense of his permanent interests by the increased power so created, in which power he would have some measure of control." The sea power itself, he feels, would gain greatly in strength, while neutrals would gain in privileges.

There is much to commend in Mr. Angell's analysis of the present situation, which occupies the greater part of the book and which is to justify and explain his remedy. His ideas about neutrality, the trend of public opinion, the generality of atrocities, the Prussianization of the Allies, are courageous and keen, and worth more consideration than they can receive here. His statements of the material interests of the great Powers, their national selfishness and lack of morality, are dramatic and convincing. Why cannot he see that his conclusions are not demonstrated by his evidence; that his picture of present international conditions makes his deductions, like his remedies, quixotic and utopian? He seems to expect Machiavelli and Caesar Borgia to accept positions from the Carnegie Institution to propagate international morality. If, as he says, "the growth of the spirit of nationality is admittedly the outstanding fact" of the nineteenth century, and has weakened the public belief in "the conception of European society or of Christendom as a unity" (p. 189), how can he conclude that the time has come for the partial blurring of those national lines by some form of international coöperation? If the latter is possible the former is not true; if his analysis is accurate his conclusion is unfounded. The desirability of international comity and organization is one subject; its possibility is another, and is in this case that under discussion.

To demonstrate, moreover, that the present difficulty in Europe is the lack of a common policy among nations (p. 316) and that there is yet no "international will to cooperate" (p. 311), is to prove that the antecedent conditions are not yet in existence upon which his plan for the internationalization of sea power must depend for success. He adds that the net result of the nineteenth century has

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"intensified the hostility on the part of modern nations to surrendering the least particle of national independence and sovereignty on behalf of any obligation to civilization or organized society as a whole" (p. 190). How then can he convince himself that England will accept his scheme for sharing with others a power which she now exercises alone? His remedy depends very obviously either upon a substantial identity of fundamental interests of all nations interested in sea power, or upon the willingness of some states to sacrifice some of their interests to further the interests of other states; yet he informs us in the most emphatic way that neither of these conditions exists. Has he not demonstrated the utopian character of his schemes? Are not his facts irreconcilable with his conclusions?

Does not Mr. Angell's internationalization of sea power ask England to denude herself in favor of a congress of nations of that very right to use her own sea power exclusively in her own interests which she is now fighting to maintain? Indeed it seems to be an utterly simple proposition that if ten men exercise a privilege which one man possessed, nine men will gain and the one man must lose. Power again, as Mr. Angell himself shows at great length, consists not in force but in the ability to use it; in the right to decide how it shall be used. Why can he not apply this generalization made in connection with American preparedness to his remedy, and see that the loss by England of the *exclusive* right to decide questions of policy disproves his contention that England will have more power by accepting his scheme than she has now?

The real issue for England is, in brief, that she would lose more than she could gain. At present Mr. Angell's scheme would assist England if it worked as he supposes, but its adoption would mean a permanent loss of England's discretionary power. Nor would she have any guarantee that the neutrals and Allies, whose interests lead them at present to regard her policy as expedient, would not in future find their interests different from hers and attempt to use their votes in the new international council to secure the adoption of a policy at least partially detrimental to her interests. For a slight present gain England would assume a future risk of unknown proportions.

It is also difficult to reconcile this new scheme with Mr. Angell's former positions. He seems to have shifted his ground; to recommend the use, as a temporary expedient, of what he has hitherto stigmatized as worthless. The effectiveness of "The Great Illusion" is largely due to his forceful demonstration of the interrelation of the economic world and of the impossibility of interfering with the free interchange of commerce without damaging the aggressor more than was worth while. War is futile because after the battle is won the victor is unable to appropriate by force the wealth of the vanquished, or, indeed—and this was Mr. Angell's peculiar contribution— to disturb the normality of the economic situation without injuring himself almost as much as the other nation. Let us not quibble about the proportion of the loss in the cases contemplated in "The Great Illusion" and in the present book. Mr. Angell's proposition to be valid must hold that, despite the fact of injury to the vanquished, the victor would himself always suffer more than was worth his while. The argument rests upon the fact that the loss of the victor cannot possibly be counterbalanced by his gains. Any interference with normal economic processes will produce much the same sort of results as will an exertion of armed force. It is not the means by which the result is achieved but the result itself with which Mr. Angell is concerned.

Mr. Angell now argues the possibility of punishing a nation by economic pressure without incurring greater loss than would be worth while. He recognizes fully that the nations exerting this pressure will suffer from it, but he does distinctly claim that the loss will not be excessive and that the punishment will be effective and produce results. If this is true, economic aggression does produce results and is therefore anything but futile. Is not this "The Great Illusion" itself—that nations can forcibly interfere with economic processes and benefit from it?

Moreover, this is precisely the aggression which the Germans claim brought on the war. It was by quiet, unassuming economic warfare that England and France were sapping the foundations of German independence. If Mr. Angell is right, if economic pressure is more effective than warfare, has he not proved the German cause and shown that the Germans, in attempting to defeat this economic pressure by force, were defending themselves against a power stronger than they possessed and did literally have their backs to the wall? If economic pressure is effective at all, the number of nations concerned in it is of small consequence. Mr. Angell's previous argument was that under no conditions was it worth while.

ROLAND G. USHER.

Tennyson in His Time

The Life and Times of Tennyson, from 1809 to 1850, by Thomas R. Lounsbury. New Haven: Yale University Press. $2.50 net.

ABOUT ten years ago, while lecturing on Tennyson at Yale, Professor Lounsbury planned this book. He wanted to give his readers first-hand knowledge of literary criticism as it was in England when Tennyson began to publish, to furnish abundant examples of the criticism which each of Tennyson's earlier volumes encountered, to describe exhaustively the literary reputations past which he slowly made his way to fame. Professor Lounsbury's aim was to give a large-scale account of Tennyson's literary background, and in this book, although left unfinished at the author's death, and written in part when his eyesight was failing, that aim is thoroughly accomplished.

Professor Cross, who has prepared Professor Lounsbury's chapters and notes for publication, found none of these twenty-three chapters in its final form, and three of them in still earlier stages. His was a nice and a difficult labor of piety, and he has done it in a most workmanlike way. Few unfinished books have so little the air of being unfinished. For the occasional signs of incompleteness Professor Cross is not responsible at all. Only Professor Lounsbury himself could have left out or shortened, and probably would have, passages here and there which deserve no place or not so great a place even in a book where there is place for so much. Five and a half pages of the chapter on "In Memoriam" are more than enough for a contemporary criticism which Professor Lounsbury exactly calls "mere twaddle." One could have spared the page and a half spent in guessing why the Cambridge authorities, having to choose a subject for poems competing for the Chancellor's medal in 1829, chose "Timbuctoo," or the half page in which attention is called to the inaptness of one of Tennyson's mottoes from Shakespeare.

The book as a whole does in fact raise no question more considerable than this general question of scale. Had Professor Lounsbury lived he would have found, one cannot help believing, a way to sacrifice a good many of his

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six hundred and thirty pages without sacrificing any desirable fullness of illustration.

Very curious and instructive is the chapter on "Critical Literature of the Period," through which we watch quarterly reviews lose their authority, and monthlies and weeklies come into existence and consideration. There is an equally valuable chapter on the waxing and waning of reputations, the decline of Byron's fame, the growth of Wordsworth's and of Shelley's, while all the time the really popular men were the very oddest collection, Philip van Artevelde Taylor, still a little readable; Course of Time Pollock and Robert Montgomery with his "Satan, or Intellect without God"; Proverbial Tupper, unmentionable nowadays without a sneer, even by persons who have read him. "Were we to draw general conclusions from the specific data furnished by the literary organs of that time," Professor Lounsbury says, "we should be forced to take the ground that contemporary criticism, at least of works of the imagination, was the most untrustworthy and valueless occupation to which the human mind can devote itself." In Tennyson's own case the voluminous evidence makes such an opinion irresistible. Reading here contemporary criticism of his earlier volumes, one is staggered by the enormity of its stupidity, one wonders afresh to what great man we of this generation are blind, and what may be the names of our Montgomeries and Tuppers.

In the plan of this book, consisting so largely of documents quoted and summarized, there is none too much room for Professor Lounsbury himself. His sarcasm, which sticks always closely to formula, rather abounds, but one would like more of his engaging pugnacity and of his neatness. Passages like this description of the country near Somersby make one regret the infrequency of his appearances all alone, unescorted by quotation: "The region all about was covered with pretty hamlets, with copse woods, with roads lined with long avenues of elms, with embowered lanes; with huge moats belonging to granges which had disappeared; with manor houses and their terraced gardens rejoicing in the gorgeous flowers with which that district of country abounded; with windmills on the wolds and water-mills in the valley; with frequent churches within whose walls lay cross-legged the monuments, as it was believed, of old crusaders. Northward of the little place rose to their greatest height the chalky cliffs of the Wolds. Mounting them was a steep and treeless pike which led to the market town of Louth. From it could be seen the long stretches of level land parallel with the coast over whose flat surface blew at times with tumultuous fury the fierce winds of the German Ocean. From the hills the eye commands the wide expanse of the marsh with its streams of channelled waters extending from horizon to horizon and moving sluggishly toward their outlet, spanned in all directions by the frequent bridge." Where will you find better description of the Lincolnshire country, except in Tennyson himself?

Nobody knows how young Tennyson was when he began to look at that country with eyes of his own, but nowadays, almost ninety years after the event, it is easy to detect even in the volume of 1830 the eye and hand of a great landscapist. Professor Lounsbury tells us how long it took professional critics to fall in with that opinion of Tennyson's greatness which his friends held while he was still a Cambridge undergraduate. As interesting a part of the field remains for some other literary historian, who will show us how Tennyson's fame has been altered and differentiated in the last thirty years, how his ideas have lost their importance, how nearly all his men and women have come to look smooth and to taste unsalted, while his music is still new to hear, except in his blank verse, and his landscape still quick with creative insight.

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Parents and Children

How to Know Your Child, by Miriam Finn Scott. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. $1.25 net.

IN the task of renovating the character of "troublesome" children Mrs. Scott has discovered a unique and futuristic profession. Those of us who believe that the younger generation is always right and the older always wrong, will delight in her cool and crushing evidence that temper, disobedience, sulkiness, selfishness, and childish morbidities of all kinds are the result of ignorance or deficiency on the part of the parent, nurse and teacher. This book, unconsciously perhaps, is one of the most beautiful defenses of childhood imaginable. It does much more than tell mothers how to know their children. It tells the world specifically how not to dam up that infantile will-to-power, in the normal child so terribly keen and true, so that it chokes in passion instead of passing off into expressive and fruitful activity. It shifts the emphasis from parental authority, obedience, training in character, and those other articulations of the parents' desire for control, over to the child's smooth happiness and expressiveness. In this book it is the parents who loom up as egoistic and unthinking.

Yet Mrs. Scott seems to know children as they are.

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She does not at all idolize or sentimentalize about them. Her attitude is both scientific and personal and, if half of what she says is true, admirably effective. She sees that much of this consecrated family life is really a disguised personal contest of wills, so that much family morality is merely a technique for saving the faces of the parents, giving them easy control of situations, and making a good showing to their friends. She sees that just because the struggle is so equal does it become often so devastating. For the craft of the parent is matched by the emotional violence of the child. The latter lacks sly inhibitions and can go with demolishing force for what it wants. And the mother is often in the dilemma of either letting her own life be worried and harassed by the child, or else of checking the child's violence with a violence of her own that only drives it into more mischievous channels. So she tends to translate what she wants the child to do into what the child ought to do, and builds up a moral clutch over the freely growing and experiencing little soul which further perverts it. If she cannot do this the untaught mother usually surrenders and, not without efforts at guerilla warfare, waits for school and playmate and grown-up life to beat the child's will into some sort of manageable shape. But the personal costliness of such a surrender is evident in all the crotchety and neurotic people around us, whose checkered childhood developed whirlpools of feeling which disturb their personal relations all through their lives.

Mrs. Scott does not delve into psychology, except to sing a rather naïve paean of John Dewey. She does not mention the Freudians, nor has she any learned theories of the emotions or volition and character. Yet after reading her you decide that there is more assimilated science in her book than in many psychological manuals. Here is the science that conceals science. She sees the primary business of mothers to be to develop persons, persons who are not merely smoothly-running family organisms. She is interested in "the person your child might be," and she sees the problem of "unspoiling your spoiled child" to be one of redirecting his energy, stimulating motive through expression. Her analysis of play is deeply suggestive. Her chapter on "Some Suggestive Cases" presents a concrete laboratory method of "history, diagnosis and recommendations" which is cleanly analytic without at the same time being anything but broadly human. The destructive child, the shy and sensitive child, the irresponsible child are analyzed, and the thoughtless repressions of school and nursery exposed. The irony of it is, of course, that these "cases" are of children from those well-to-do, enlightened and God-fearing upper-middle-class homes that set so many social and personal norms for us. These chapters touch eloquently the tragedies of growing up in the world. They map out in cooler form the unconscious exploitation that burns with such sardonic intensity from "The Way of All Flesh."

What one admires most about Mrs. Scott is her method and attack. In her freedom from moralizing, in her detached yet absorbed tone, she makes you feel that you can approach human relations intellectually and without mawkishness, and yet not be entirely heartless She makes you feel that there is really a possibility of free and flexible understanding between even the most diverse people when once this principle of the need and sacredness of sincere expression is accepted. Her book is a contribution towards social freedom, and a social freedom in what is quite the most crucial and determining of all human relationships, that of parents and children. R. B.



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